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GESTATION: WORK FOR HIRE OR THE ESSENCE OF MOTHERHOOD?
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS
PAMELA LAUFER-UKELES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Motherhood is no longer a simple concept. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“mother” as “a woman who has given birth to or legally adopted a child.”1 Re-
cent advances in reproductive technologies have called into question this basic
definition of motherhood. Through in vitro fertilization, it is possible to extract
an egg from one woman and implant the fertilized egg into the uterus of another
woman, thereby severing the genetic and gestational aspects of motherhood.
Depending on the identity of the intended mother, this process is known either
as gestational or full surrogacy (if the egg donor is the intended mother and the
birth mother is acting as a surrogate) or egg donation (if the birth mother is the
intended mother and another woman acted as an egg donor).2 The legal mother
in gestational surrogate motherhood could be the egg donor, the intended
mother, the birth mother or some combination thereof. In U.S. case law,
“mother” has been defined in a variety of ways, including the woman who do-
nates an ovum and the woman who intends to be the mother of a new born.3
U.S. courts have held that whatever motherhood is, the Black’s Law definition of
giving birth to a child is not necessarily definitive.4
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1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (7th ed. 1999).
2. Traditional or partial surrogacy necessitates only artificial insemination; the birth mother is
also the egg donor and is therefore the genetic mother. In vitro fertilization allows for the division of
the normal process of childbirth; one woman the donator of the child’s genes and the other woman
carries and gives birth to the child. This division happens in two contexts. The first is in egg dona-
tion, where a woman who cannot produce a fertile egg uses another woman’s egg, which is then in-
seminated with her husband’s sperm. The second is gestational surrogacy where a woman who
cannot carry a pregnancy to term hires or recruits another woman to carry the child for her.
3. See infra Part II(B), notes 35-73 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part II(B), notes 35-73 and accompanying text.
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The potential ethical implications of surrogate motherhood have garnered
considerable public attention,5 largely because the different definitions of moth-
erhood are based on competing ethical outlooks. The argument for autonomy
and choice, strongly advocated by Dr. Carmel Shalev, maintains that women
have a right to sell gestational services along with the sale of their ova and to re-
ceive payment for using their wombs. She argues that to deny women the right
to do so based on concerns for their ability to consent to such a contract is patri-
archal in that it questions a women’s ability to make valid contracts and mini-
mizes their full autonomy.6 This argument favors choice and intention as the
determining factors in deciding legal motherhood. On the other end of the
spectrum is the argument for protection of women from financial exploitation
and the imperative to keep certain body parts or biological acts sacred, similar to
the prohibition on prostitution.7 This point of view favors using gestation or
parturition as the definition of motherhood, thereby making surrogacy ar-
rangements less palatable since the birth mother will always be considered the
legal mother.
The act of defining motherhood also involves a value judgment that affects
the use of reproductive technologies.8 Allowing a woman’s or a couple’s inten-
5. The case of In re Baby M received much public attention from reporters as well as scholars.
See, e.g., Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1986);
Shari O’Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127 (1986);
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REV. 405 (1983).
6. CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 120-23, 149-51 (1989); see also Lori
Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS
AND PRIVACY, 171-76 (Larry Golstin, ed., 1990) (arguing that negative reactions to surrogacy pater-
nalistically assume that women cannot act in their own best interests); Janet L. Dolgin, Status and
Contract In Feminist Legal Theory of the Family, 12 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 103, 104-08 (1990) (arguing
that family law should be based on contract principles).
7. See Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Motherhood? An Ethical Analysis, 16
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 57, 62 (1988) (arguing against enforcement of surrogacy agreements be-
cause they are exploitive of poor women); Janice Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The
Altruistic Woman, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 11 (arguing that even altruistic surrogacy is
exploitive, in that it sets women apart as the caregiver and the breeder class).
8. The underlying ethical complexity of defining motherhood stems from an attack on the con-
cept of “natural” motherhood by the advent of modern technology. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene:
Judicial Assumptions about Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 673 (1993).
There have been four basic approaches used to determine motherhood in the absence of a clear
natural definition. Some writers advocate contract principles which privilege the intended mother
as the legal mother according to the dictates of an agreement or consent form from the egg donor.
See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Paren-
tal Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 419 (1991) (concluding that contractual intent provides a rule of
certainty in favor of the “prime movers” of the child’s conception); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation
of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 72 (1987) (arguing for a free market in babies and repro-
ductive services); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 397-98 (reasoning that contract principles
further the gender-neutral goals of intention and choice in reproductive decisions).
Others argue that the genetic mother should be considered the legal mother because the genetic
contribution is the most significant. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our
Understanding of the Family, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb., 1991, at 5 (considering the various meth-
ods, including genetics, to determine the actual mother); Suzanne F. Seavello, Are You My Mother? A
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tion to determine legal parenthood in reproductive technology situations pro-
motes the use of these technologies. Those who believe that intention and ge-
netics are the significant factors in determining motherhood tend to promote the
use of gestational surrogate motherhood.9 If it is determined that the genetic or
intended mother is the legal mother, such contracts would not be controversial
because the contract would provide for the mother who is thereby defined as the
natural or legal mother to be given custody. Thus, such definitions avoid at-
tacks of baby-selling and exploitation of women and their babies.
On the other hand, those who believe that gestational surrogates should be
deemed the legal mothers generally do not distinguish between traditional sur-
rogate motherhood and gestational surrogacy, and tend to oppose both.10 De-
spite the popularity of traditional surrogate motherhood contracts, when courts
are faced with opposing claims of the surrogate and intended mothers to the
child, they have deemed traditional surrogate motherhood agreements unen-
forceable and against public policy because they are seen as a form of baby sell-
ing.11 If gestation is considered the basis of legal motherhood, similar problems
would arise in gestational surrogacy, as the legal (natural) mother would be
contracting to give up her own child. Preserving biology and gestation as de-
termining factors that cannot be altered through intent alone makes the use of
these technologies more complex. Preserving the natural status of the gesta-
tional mother despite a contract that provides otherwise throws uncertainty over
the whole process by allowing the surrogate mother to withdraw from the con-
tract or protest.
In contrast to these logically polar viewpoints, Jewish law is in the un-
wieldy position of having legal precedent that weighs in favor of holding that
the gestational surrogate is the legal mother, and simultaneously supporting the
Judge’s Decision in In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 211, 211-24 (1992) (argu-
ing for a genetics based determination);
Still others clam that gestation is the most significant element of motherhood. See, e.g., SCOTT B.
RAE, THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES? (1994) (arguing that the
woman who gives birth to the child should be considered the legal mother of the child); BARBARA
KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL
SOCIETY (1989) (arguing that the essential maternal tie is based on carrying the child in pregnancy).
Others rely upon a “best interests of the child” standard for their final determination of which
woman is the mother. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 126-60, 151-52 (1988) (ar-
guing for a best interest test with a presumption of maternal custody in traditional surrogacy). An-
other original suggestion that has been made is for both women to be considered as the “mother” of
the child and for a kinship relationship to ensue. See Randy Frances Kandel, Which Came First: The
Mother or the Egg? A Kinship Solution to Gestational Surrogacy 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 165, 168, 221-22
(1994) (arguing for multiple mothers from the perspective of a kinship relationship).
9. For commentators who have argued for the standard of intent and who also support surro-
gate motherhood, see generally Posner, supra note 8; Hill, supra note 8; Schultz, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., RAE, supra note 8, at 77-116 (arguing that the woman who gives birth to the child
should be considered the legal mother of the child and opposing commercial surrogate mother-
hood); ROTHMAN, supra note 8, at 229-46 (arguing that pregnancy and interpersonal relationships
determine a woman’s fitness to parent and not genetic ties or intent).
11. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Egg donations present fewer problems be-
cause an egg donor contributes her eggs and immediately waives all rights to the child. The dona-
tion is often anonymous, but even if it is not, the egg donor has much less of a physiological connec-
tion with the child.
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usage of reproductive technologies in order to promote the important goal of
reproduction.12 Motherhood in Jewish law is rigidly defined and derived from
precedent and through the use of analogy. The traditional and morally norma-
tive perspective of Jewish law necessitates an analysis of the surrogate mothers’
status without subverting this concern to overriding consequentialist opinions
as to whether or not surrogate motherhood should be permissible. Therefore,
Jewish law provides a forum for analyzing the definition of motherhood in iso-
lation from the larger issue of the permissibility of surrogate motherhood.
The U.S. has ultimately placed an overwhelming emphasis on the impor-
tance of genetics and intention in defining motherhood in gestational surrogacy,
and has largely supported gestational surrogate contracts.13 On the other hand,
Jewish law, for the most part, has endorsed the criteria of birth as the defining
factor of motherhood.14 However, Jewish law’s emphasis on biology and gender
difference that lead to identifying the birth mother as the legal mother has not
prevented a number of prominent Jewish law authorities from condoning ges-
tational surrogate motherhood agreements. The result is that whether the
mother is originally defined as the intended mother, as she is in U.S. law, or
whether the surrogate is defined as the legal mother, as she is in Jewish law, le-
gal systems find a means of permitting the use of surrogate motherhood. The
two systems of law are striking in their distinctive analyses of gestational surro-
gate motherhood, yet they are also striking in the similarity of their conclusions.
Both of these legal systems subjugate the rights of the surrogate mother and
are paternalistic. Allowing gestational surrogate motherhood, without provi-
sions for the protection of the surrogate, leads to sublimating the woman’s rights
for the sake of the biological father and his wife. The purpose of this paper is to
show how two different legal approaches to surrogate motherhood, with differ-
ent premises and, most importantly, two different ways of defining mother-
hood, each ignore the rights of the surrogate mothers because of patriarchal con-
siderations.
U.S. law fails to take any account of gender differences or the importance of
gestation in a woman’s experience of motherhood, and uses the concept of
“natural” blithely in order to facilitate the use of surrogate motherhood. Thus
U.S. law uses male standards of judgment as to what constitutes parenthood
and ignores that which is unique about motherhood. Alternately, Jewish law,
while recognizing the surrogate mother as the natural mother, ultimately sub-
sumes her rights for the sake of procreation and the importance of fatherhood.
By means of contrast and comparison of U.S. law and Jewish law, this arti-
cle will uncover those principles of each legal system that lead to their disregard
12. For the purposes of this article, Jewish law refers to that law which finds its source in The
Bible and The Talmud. See infra note 102 for a more complete explanation of Jewish law and its
sources. This use of Jewish law is meant to be non-sectarian and applicable to all denominations of
Judaism. However, this article does not use response from Conservative or Reformed Rabbis; rather
the usage of Jewish law is most reflective of Orthodox Judaism. For a summary of opinions that ex-
plain Jewish law’s support of reproductive technologies see David J. Bleich, In Vitro Fertilization:
Questions of Maternal Identity and Conversion, in JEWISH LAW AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 46 (Emanuel Feldman & Joel Wolowelsky eds., 1997).
13. See infra Part II(B).
14. See infra Part II(C).
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of the gestational surrogate’s rights. The flow of the argument will center on
Jewish law and will simultaneously compare and contrast U.S. law. Since sur-
rogate motherhood agreements entail varied arrangements, the comparative
analysis will be carried out through a focus on the Israeli Surrogate Agreements
Law,15 which is substantially identical or comparable to a number of U.S. State
laws.16
Part II will focus on different legal approaches to defining motherhood in
the context of surrogate motherhood. The Israeli, American and Jewish law
precedent on legal motherhood in gestational surrogacy will be examined.
Based on the majority decision of Jewish authorities as to the identity of the
gestational mother as the legal mother, Part III discusses the feasibility of en-
forcing surrogacy contracts under Jewish law in comparison to the factors dic-
tating whether these contracts are enforced or not enforced in the U.S. Part IV
discusses other legal principles that may influence the permissibility of gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements, despite the problems with promoting such con-
tracts uncovered in the previous sections: the imperative to procreate, adoption
and custody. Finally, Part V will explain how both systems are ultimately patri-
archal and subjugate the rights of the gestational surrogate in favor of the rights
of the intended parents due to male-based standards and interests.
II. THE DEFINITION OF MOTHERHOOD
A. The Israel Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Law
The Israeli Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Law (“Surrogate Agree-
ments Law”) was enacted after recommendations were offered by the Aloni
Commission, set up to discuss the ethical, legal and religious implications of re-
productive technologies, including surrogate motherhood.17 With the passing of
15. Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Law, 1996, S.H. 1577 [hereinafter Surrogate Agreements
Law].
16. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1997) is the only statute that, by its implication, is identical
to that of Israel by condoning commercial gestational surrogate motherhood and not traditional sur-
rogate motherhood. Other statutes exist in certain jurisdictions of the U.S. that regulate surrogate
motherhood, but no other law besides the Florida statute and Israeli law go so far as to facilitate the
transfer of children born of gestational surrogate motherhood agreements for consideration to the
intended mothers. See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (for a discussion of U.S. statutes that
regulate surrogate motherhood).
17. Prior to the passing of the law, a commission headed by former Judge Shaul Aloni, was
called to evaluate the social, ethical, halakhic (Jewish law) and legal aspects of the methods of treat-
ment related to in vitro fertilization, including the possibility of surrogate motherhood contracts. See
ISRAEL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC-PROFESSIONAL COMMISSION IN THE MATTER
OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (1994)[hereinafter ALONI COMMISSION REPORT]. The committee was
gathered shortly after a court case called on the High Court of Justice to direct the Minister of Health
to explain why regulations had been drawn by the Ministry that prevented them for engaging a sur-
rogate mother in Israel. H.C. 1237/91, Nachmani v. Minister of Health (unpublished). The regula-
tions referred to are the Public Health Regulations on IVF (In Vitro Fertilization), 1987, K.T. 5035,
978, which outlawed surrogate motherhood agreements by stating that “[a]n ovum will not be
transplanted unless it is into the womb of the woman who will be the child’s mother.” Ultimately,
the majority of the Commission proposed to allow surrogate motherhood agreements on the condi-
tion that they receive prior approval, before conception, from a statutory committee with other
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the Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Law in 1996, Israel became a pioneer in
regulating and facilitating commercial surrogacy agreements. Since the passing
of the law, there have been more than 12 children born to surrogate mothers in
accordance with surrogacy contracts pre-approved by a committee as mandated
by the law. The first birth took place in February 1998, with the first surrogate
twins born in Israel and the use of the surrogacy contracts is growing more and
more common.18
The Surrogate Agreements Law allows only for gestational surrogate ar-
rangements, thereby implicitly forbidding traditional surrogacy.19 Traditional
surrogacy is usually accomplished through artificial insemination, while gesta-
tional surrogacy necessitates in vitro fertilization, a more complicated procedure
for the surrogate mother.20 In addition, according to the Surrogate Agreements
Law, the sperm must be from the intended father.21
The Surrogate Agreements Law does not give any legal status to the birth
mother upon the child’s birth. Legal parenthood is delegated to the intended
parents almost immediately.22 The Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Law
states, “The child shall, from its birth, be in the custody of the intended parents,
and they shall bear toward it all the responsibilities and obligations of a parent
to his child.”23 Delivery of the child by the birth mother into the custody of the
intended parents must be in the presence of a Welfare Officer and must be car-
ried out as soon as possible after the birth of the child.24 Within seven days of
the child’s birth, the intended parents must apply for a parentage order.25 The
parentage order is given to the intended parents by the court automatically, un-
less, after having received a report from the Welfare Officer, the court deter-
mines that doing so would endanger the child’s welfare.26 The intended parents
are the “default” parents and, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
they will be given custody of the child upon its birth and full rights of parentage
shortly thereafter.
The legal status of the intended parents is buttressed by the surrogate
mother’s lack of a right to withdraw from the agreement.27 The law states that
specified limitations. The two members in the minority did not disagree with the principle of regu-
lating surrogacy and ultimately allowing it, but with the details of the regulatory scheme. The Aloni
Commission’s recommendations were accepted in part and partially modified in the Surrogate
Agreements Law. See Rhona Schuz, The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen Embryos, in THE
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 237 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1996).
18. See Allison Kaplan Sommer, Labor Pains, THE JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 7, 2000, at 14-17.
19. Surrogate Agreements Law, supra note 15, § 2(4).
20. For a full explanation of gestational and traditional surrogacy, see In re Marriage of Mos-
chetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Michael Korinaldi, The Legal Status of a Child Born of
Artificial Insemination from a Donor or from an Egg Donor, 18 SHNATON HAMISHPAT HAIVRI 64-65
(1995).
21. Surrogate Agreements Law, supra note 15, § 2(4).
22. Id. § 10(a).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 10(c).
25. Id. § 11(a). Until that time, a welfare officer is to be appointed guardian of the child. Id. §
10(b).
26. Surrogate Agreements Law, supra note 15, § 11(a).
27. Id. § 13.
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the court will not give its approval for the birth mother to withdraw from the
contract “unless it is satisfied, after having received a report from the Welfare
Officer, that there has been a change of circumstances which justifies the birth
mother’s withdrawal of her consent, and that this is not likely to have an ad-
verse effect on the child’s welfare.”28 But even this limited provision for possible
withdrawal does not exist after a parentage order has been made.29 The Israeli
law is designed to facilitate and not impede these agreements by legalizing the
relationship of the genetic mother and her genetic child, and minimizing the
rights of the gestational mother.
The Israel Adoption Law declares that “the adoption ends the obligations
and rights between the adopted child and his parents and the rest of his family
and the authority given to them over him. . . .”30 In contrast, the Surrogate
Agreements Law does not necessitate a transfer of rights from the birth mother
to the intended parents. The law assumes that these rights never existed, and
requires only a parentage order. When a parentage order is made, “the in-
tended parents shall be the parents and sole guardians of the child, and it shall
be their child for all intents and purposes.”31 Even stronger language was used
in the Aloni Commission’s recommendations on the matter of surrogate moth-
erhood, “With the transfer of the child from the surrogate mother to the in-
tended parents, in the presence of a Welfare Officer, they [the intended parents]
will be considered the parents of the child, and the child will be considered the
natural child for all purposes.”32
The Israeli law is an ideal point of comparison because it is one of the first
to actively facilitate such surrogate motherhood agreements. In addition, there
is significant discourse between Jewish and Israeli law making it possible to ex-
amine opinions by Jewish law authorities on Israeli law, which permits only
gestational surrogate motherhood. Such direct opinions will allow for definitive
rather than speculative judgments as to what Jewish law holds with regards to
various provisions of surrogate motherhood. While issues of medical treatment
discussed in this paper are not under the jurisdiction of Jewish law in Israel, in
matters affecting ability to marry and legitimacy of children, Jewish law (“halak-
hic”) considerations may affect the civil law determination.33 Furthermore, the
28. Id. § 13(a). Although this issue has not arisen or been litigated in the administrative context,
possible changes in circumstances likely include: death of an intended parent, divorce of the in-
tended parents, or refusal of an intended parent to care for the child.
29. Id. § 11.
30. Israel Adoption Law, 1996 A.G. 29 § 13.
31. Surrogate Agreements Law, supra note 15, § 12(a).
32. See ALONI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 21.
33. Israel has a chief Rabbinate and is self-identified as a Jewish state. Although Jewish law
does not govern, Jewish religious leaders have considerable influence on Israeli law and often pass
judgment on Israeli laws. Israeli law is influenced by Jewish law in a number of ways—by use of
Jewish law in judicial determinations and interpretations of Israeli laws, and incorporation of Jewish
law into Israeli legislation and statutes by reference.
The Israeli legal system is comprised of a number of different components. Much of the law is a
codification of English common law that was instituted before the establishment of the State. Until
1980, English common law was considered binding on the law of Israel, where relevant. The Foun-
dations of Law Act effectively and formally dislodged Israeli law from English law and determined
that, “Where the court finds that a legal issue requiring decision cannot be resolved by reference to
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Israeli law epitomizes the movement promoting progressive pro-reproductive
technologies and reproductive freedom that will continue to challenge us as sci-
ence progresses.34
B. United States Law
1. Case Law
In the limited circumstances in which U.S. Courts have been asked to de-
termine their permissibility, they have held that traditional surrogate mother-
hood contracts are either invalid, unenforceable or at least voidable.35
legislation or judicial precedent, or my means of analogy, it shall reach its decision in the light of the
principles of freedom, justice equity and peace of the Jewish heritage.” See The Foundations of Law
Act, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 181 (1979-80). Simultaneously, Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council and
Saving Clause, which implemented the system of British law was repealed. Thereafter, English and
American law, as well as Jewish law, are used to analyze issues not yet dealt with in Israeli law, even
though Israeli law is an independent system.
There are essentially two other ways that Jewish law is incorporated into Israeli law: by reference
and directly. See generally, Itzchak Englard, The Place of Religious Law in the Israel Legal System, 2
MISHPATIM 268, 291 (1970); Brayahu Lifshitz, Israeli Law and Jewish Law—Interaction and Independence,
24 ISRAEL L. REV. 507 (1990). Under the Rabbinical Court Law, Rabbinical courts are given exclusive
authority in “matters of marriage and divorce of Jews.” See Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction (Marriage
and Divorce) Law, 1953, 7 L.S.I. 139 (1953) [hereinafter Rabbinical Court Law]. Accordingly, there is
no civil marriage or divorce in Israel. Besides having exclusive jurisdiction over matters of personal
status, the rabbinical courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the request of the wife in maintenance
claims that are not part of a divorce settlement. Id. Questions of paternity, however, have been held
not to be under concurrent jurisdiction. See H.C. 283/72, Buaron v. The Rabbinical Tribunal, 1972
26(2) P.D. 727.
Another area of interaction between Jewish law and Israeli law is through direct incorporation.
Direct incorporation occurs when the legislator adopts canons of Jewish law into the civil law code
as original Israeli legislation. See Lifshitz, this note, at 512-23. The Israeli legislator makes no specific
reference to the rules of Jewish law but incorporates Jewish law principles. There is no doubt that
Jewish law has substantially influenced Israeli statutory law. See, e.g., N. RAKOVER, JEWISH LAW IN
THE LEGISLATION OF THE KNESSET (1989) (providing a comprehensive listing and discussion of Israeli
laws that have been influenced by Jewish law considerations).
Furthermore, under the Rabbinical Court Law, Rabbinical courts are given exclusive authority in
“matters of marriage and divorce of Jews.” See Rabbinical Court Law, 7 L.S.I. 139, (1953). Accord-
ingly, there is no civil marriage or divorce in Israel.
34. See, e.g., Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Redefining Parenthood, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J., 313 (1999);
Carmel Shalev, Halakhah and Patriarchal Motherhood—An Anatomy of the New Israeli Surrogacy Law, 32
ISRAEL L. REV. 51 (1998).
35. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Ending Gap Between the Science of Artifi-
cial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 849-50
(1999); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 77
A.L.R. 4th 70 (1990 & Supp. 1999); see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 704
S.W.2d. 209 (Ky. 1986) (holding that surrogate contracts were voidable but not void); Doe v. Kelley,
307 N.W. 2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (prohibiting surrogacy agreement because it would violate a
statute prohibiting the exchange of money or other consideration in connection with an adoption
and related proceedings); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), remanded to 542 A.2d 52 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) (determining that surrogacy agreement was void based, in part, on its conclu-
sion that the payment of money to a surrogate mother conflicted with a state statute prohibiting the
payment of money in connection with the acceptance of a child and on the basis of public policy); In
re Baby Girl, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1986) (holding that the agreements were not per se void
but were voidable depending on the circumstances of the case).
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In the widely publicized case of In re Baby M,36 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey based its opinion on the unlawfulness of prenatal adoption. In order to
terminate parental rights in private placement adoptions, the court must find an
“intentional abandonment or a very substantial neglect of the parental duties
without a reasonable expectation of a reversal of that conduct in the future.”37
Private prenatal agreements are not enforceable unless the birth mother inten-
tionally abandons her child after birth. Therefore, the surrogacy arrangement,
which committed the surrogate mother to surrender her parental rights before
she gave birth, was deemed illegal and unenforceable. In addition, the court
held that the contract violated societal norms against baby selling and was
thereby against public policy.38
In two cases that discuss uncontested parentage orders as opposed to dis-
puted custody, courts have held that the surrogacy arrangement should not be
considered a void prenatal adoption but rather a prenatal custody arrangement
between two parents.39 However, both cases reserved the possibility that the
contracts would be voidable in a contested case where there was undue influ-
ence, fraud, or excessive payments.40 These cases are examples of voluntary re-
linquishment of the child after the child’s birth, and are therefore not at odds
with adoption procedures since the birth mother consents to transfer.
On the other hand, the courts discussing the issue of gestational surrogacy
in the U.S. have consistently held that the intended mother is the legal mother.
However, the opinions are divided as to whether the determining factor should
be intent or genetics.
In Anna J. v. Mark C.,41 Mrs. Calvert’s ovum was fertilized with the sperm of
her husband using in vitro fertilization.42 The fertilized ovum was then im-
planted into the uterus of Ms. Johnson, the surrogate mother, pursuant to a sur-
rogacy contract in which Ms. Johnson agreed to relinquish “all parental rights”
to the child in favor of the Calverts, who were to take the baby into their home
“as their child.”43 After the birth, Ms. Johnson refused to relinquish the child to
the intended parents and sought custody of the child.44 The trial court, in a
bench ruling, held that the Calverts were the natural parents because they were
the genetic parents.45 The trial court emphasized that the case was not compara-
ble to traditional surrogacy, but rather, characterized Ms. Johnson as more of a
caretaker, similar to a babysitter, wet nurse, or temporary foster mother.46 The
36. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1234.
39. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212-13; In re Baby Girl, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
40. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 213; In re Baby Girl, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
41. 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1993), cert. denied; 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
42. Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
43. Id.
44. The Calverts refused to pay the remaining payments because they contended that Ms. John-
son had failed to disclose that she had suffered several stillbirths and miscarriages. Ms. Johnson felt
that the Calverts had not done enough to obtain the required insurance policy. Id.
45. See id. at 373.
46. Id. at 377-78.
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Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that the natural and thus legal mother is
the genetic mother.47 Through a narrow, and arguably contorted, reading of the
Uniform Parentage Act,48 the court reasoned that genetics was the deciding fac-
tor in parentage.49
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision but on different
grounds.50 The court stated, “for any child California law recognizes only one
natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology rendering a differ-
ent outcome biologically possible.”51 The court held that the statute relied upon
by the lower court was unable to resolve the question of which woman was the
natural mother.52 Rather, the court decided that natural parentage should be
determined by contractual intent, even though it determined not to make the
decision on the basis of the surrogacy contract itself.53 Therefore, the court held
that the intended mother was the natural mother54 and that the gestational
mother had no rights at all.55
The analysis of the court’s decision discloses a fundamental difficulty in the
interpretation of the concept of nature. Can the natural mother simply be the
mother who has the proper intent, or is the natural mother a term denoting
something pre-contractual?56 Professor Kandel explains that even in the legal
sphere a difference does exist between a contractual and natural mother,
The status of natural parent may constrain and limit contracts concerning chil-
dren, such as child support, but even when a woman relinquishes her child
through adoption, or loses it to the state as a consequence of her delinquent be-
havior, her status as a natural parent does not change. Contract, however, can
alter parental rights and obligations, including the child’s custody, as frequently
evidenced in divorce and separation agreements.57
47. Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
48. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7600-750 (West 1994). The Act authorizes the admission of certain bio-
logical evidence as sufficient proof of parentage. See id. § 7610(a). Pursuant to the Act, parentage
can be established by blood test evidence, and maternity “may” be established “by proof of . . . hav-
ing given birth to the child. . .” Id. The court read the Act as establishing a scheme in which blood
test evidence, which establishes the genetic relationship, is conclusively more persuasive than child-
birth evidence, which establishes gestational relationship. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1994) (attacking the appellate court’s use of the statute); Kandel, supra
note 8, at 173-78 (arguing that choosing kinship provides a better model of maternity via dual moth-
ers in the case of surrogacy, then traditional two-parent assumptions).
49. See Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 374 & n.14 (discussing the purpose of the Act’s enactment in
California).
50. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 787.
51. Id. at 781.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 782-84.
54. Id. at 782.
55. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 786. For a discussion of why intent can not be a basis for determining
“natural” motherhood, see Dolgin, supra note 8; Jeffrey M. Place, Gestational Surrogacy and the Mean-
ing of “Mother”: Johnson v. Calvert, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 913-14 (1994).
56. Dolgin also explores the complexity of using intent as a means of defining the natural and
argues that this is a fundamental fallacy since a contract by definition is not natural. See Dolgin, su-
pra note 8.
57. Kandel, supra note 8, at 177.
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Justice Kennard, in his minority opinion, berated the court for its reliance
on a contractual standard, arguing that rules derived from tort law, intellectual
property law, commercial law or contract law were inadequate to protect the
interests of either the child or the gestational mother.58 He opted to decide the
case according to the best interests of the child, and avoided the question of the
natural mother altogether.59
A number of cases following Johnson have relied on the rule of intent.60
However, there is another line of cases that has based decisions on genetics as
opposed to intent.61 In Belsito v. Clark, the Ohio Supreme Court faced a similar
task of determining who is the legal mother in gestational surrogate mother-
hood.62 One month prior to her marriage to Anthony Belsito, Ms. Belsito had to
undergo a hysterectomy due to a bout with cervical cancer, resulting in her in-
ability to carry children.63 The doctors were able to preserve her ovaries so that
she would be able to produce eggs. Carol Clark, Ms. Belsito’s younger sister,
agreed to carry Ms. Belsito’s egg fertilized with Anthony’s sperm through in vi-
tro fertilization. According to Ohio law, upon its birth, the child was to be reg-
istered as the child of Carol Clark, the surrogate mother.64 Therefore, the Belsi-
tos filed a complaint for declaratory judgment stating that it is unnecessary for
them to adopt the child now carried by Carol Clark and that they should be
listed as the birth parents on the birth certificate.65
The court decided to grant the declaratory judgment in favor of the Belsi-
tos. In his majority opinion, Judge Spicer stated that, “a review of case law leads
to the conclusion that the term “natural parent” refers to the child and parent
being of the same blood or related by blood.66 Furthermore, he determined that
in modern terminology, blood relationship is the equivalent to genetics.67 He ar-
gued that the Uniform Parentage Act of Ohio, which holds that either birth or
DNA tests can determine the mother, has caused confusion in the case of surro-
58. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 795-98 (Kennard J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 789.
60. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (determining the
egg providing mother to be the legal mother in accordance with the rule of intent when the child
was conceived by anonymous sperm and egg donation); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (stating that the gestational surrogate was the parent since she received the
egg from an anonymous donor and was the woman who intended to raise the child). Under the test
articulated in Johnson v. Calvert, either the gestational surrogate or the genetic parents could be rec-
ognized as the natural and legal parents, depending on which party intended to procreate and raise
the child.
61. See Smith v. Jones, No. 85-53201402 (Mich. Cir. Ct. March 14, 1986) (holding that the in-
tended mother who donated the egg was the legal mother due to her genetic donation and pro-
claiming the gestational surrogate “a human incubator”). This was the first case of gestational sur-
rogacy to go to court.
62. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 1994).
63. Id. at 761.
64. Id. at 762.
65. Id.
66. Id. Judge Spicer cites Owens v. Bell, 451 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ohio 1983) and BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 172 (6th ed. rev. 1990).
67. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d at 763.
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gacy and that the law must adapt by eliminating birth as a determining factor.68
In Belsito, the court noted that the Johnson rule of intent amounts to selling or
transferring the status of natural parenthood before the child’s birth, and is
therefore a de facto recognition of the contract.69 The court concluded that the
Johnson rule is an unacceptable violation of public policy.70
In addition, Judge Spicer determined that surrendering one’s egg or sperm
amounts to the surrender of a fundamental right, which necessitates express
consent from the donor in order to allow such a transfer.71 He argued that the
intent test alone does not do enough to protect the involuntary use of genes.72
However, he conceded that these genetic rights can be contracted away, thereby
basically supporting the reproductive technologies but with a genetic emphasis.
According to Judge Spicer’s’ test of genetics, a gestational mother who intends
to be the parent using an egg donation must follow the laws of adoption and
obtain donor waivers of parental rights.73
Despite the differences between the genetics standard and the intent stan-
dard, all U.S. courts ultimately favor the intended parents in gestational surro-
gate motherhood arrangements and reject the contract as a legal document in
and of itself. Unlike in traditional surrogacy cases where the host mother who is
also the genetic mother and the surrogate is generally deemed to be the natural
mother, gestational cases focus on the assignment of the status of the “natural”
mother. Thus, an obvious focus underlying such decisions is genetic make-up
since only the fact that the intended mother is the egg donor distinguishes tra-
ditional surrogacy from gestational surrogacy.
2. U.S. Statutes
The federal government of the United States has not regulated the enforce-
ability of surrogate motherhood contracts. A number of states have left the issue
of surrogacy contracts to the judicial system, thereby dealing with the issue de
facto. The majority of states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”),
and applied the act to traditional surrogacy contracts.74 Under the UPA, a parent
can be established by either proving a genetic relationship or by the woman
bearing and delivering the child.75 Applying the UPA to a traditional surrogacy
situation, the surrogate and the semen provider are the child’s mother and fa-
ther. However, in the gestational surrogacy context, as discussed above, both
68. Id. at 764. Furthermore, he states, “ . . . [S]ociety and the law recognize only one natural
mother.” Id. This statement eliminates, through strict statutory interpretation, the possibility that a
child might have two mothers. For an argument that such reasoning assumes the answer before
delving into the question of natural motherhood ,see Kandel, supra note 8, at 173-78.
69. Clark, 644 N.E.2d at 765.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 766.
72. Id. If an egg is stolen from a woman during removal of other eggs, a question exists as to
whether she has a right to refuse to give her eggs to another woman for the other woman to have
them implanted in her body. According to the rule of intent, even a woman who uses the eggs
without the other woman’s consent would be considered the natural mother.
73. Id. at 767.
74. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7700 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
75. Id. § 7610.
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husband and wife are often genetically related to the child, providing both the
intended mother and the surrogate with a claim.
Only one state, Florida, has enacted a statute that specifically allows for
commercial gestational surrogacy contracts and denies any rights to the gesta-
tional surrogate, similar to the Israeli Surrogate Agreements Law.76 The gesta-
tional contract is held to be binding as long as the surrogate is at least 18 year of
age and the intended mother cannot gestate a pregnancy to term, or doing so
would be hazardous to her health.77 According to the law, the gestational surro-
gate agrees to relinquish any parental rights upon the child’s birth and to pro-
ceed with the judicial proceedings to transfer parenthood, unless it is deter-
mined that neither member of the commissioning couple is a genetic parent.78
Similar to the Israeli statute, there is no right to withdraw consent.79 Without the
genetic link, the surrogate mother is not considered to have any claims to the
child.
Virginia has a statute that permits non-commercial surrogacy agreements.80
Interestingly, upon the birth of the child the surrogate mother is considered the
child’s mother, unless the intended mother is a genetic parent, in which case the
intended mother is considered the mother.81
Other state statutes do not differentiate between traditional and gestational
surrogacy, which leaves uncertainty as to whether they apply to gestational sur-
rogate cases. The District of Columbia,82 Indiana,83 Michigan,84 New York,85
North Dakota,86 and Utah87 deny enforcement of all surrogacy contracts. Ken-
tucky,88 Louisiana,89 Nebraska,90 and Washington91 deny enforcement of commer-
cial surrogacy contracts. New Hampshire makes non-commercial surrogacy
agreements enforceable but grants the surrogate mother the right to terminate
the agreement, unconditionally, 72 hours after the birth of the child.92 According
to the statute, after approval of a judicial hearing, the rights of the birth mother
and her husband are terminated. Arkansas is the only state that has passed leg-
islation providing an unconditional presumption of validity of traditional sur-
rogacy arrangements commercial and non-commercial. The state’s statute con-
cludes that a child born to a surrogate mother is the child of the “intended
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1997).
77. Id. § 742.15(2).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, 10-160(b)(4) (Michie 1995).
81. Id.
82. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (1997).
83. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (Michie 1997).
84. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 1993).
85. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 22:122 (McKinney 1997).
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1997).
87. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995).
88. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1995).
89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991).
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1995).
91. WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 1997).
92. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (1994).
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parents” and not that of the surrogate.93 However, the Arkansas statute pre-
serves the surrogate mother as the legal mother for purposes of registration.94
C. Jewish Law
Jewish legal authorities have approached this inquiry with seriousness
equal to the U.S. courts and legislators, but with a significantly different empha-
sis. The court’s solution in Johnson v. Calvert to the maternity question of gesta-
tional surrogacy, based upon the intent of the parties, has not been discussed in
Jewish legal sources. Dr. Chaim Povarsky comments, “The notion of establish-
ing a parent-child relationship based upon the intent of the parties who are in-
volved in the production of the child is alien to Jewish thought.”95 This is be-
cause, as will be discussed in the following section, Jewish law does not
traditionally recognize the establishment of parental status by intent in any
form, even by adoption or when all parties agree.96 Intention is foreign to Jewish
law as a basis for determining natural relationships such as motherhood.
Another distinction between the methodology of U.S. law and Jewish law is
that secular law is mainly concerned with the custody of the child and the rights
of the surrogate mother and the intended parents to the child, whereas Jewish
law is mostly concerned with the status of the child established by the identity
of its mother.97 Jewish law authorities who have commented on the identity of
the mother, have done so with an emphasis on determining the child’s lineage,
not the child’s care.98
In Jewish law, regardless of who cares for the child, lineage has significant
consequences. The establishment of parenthood relates to the fulfillment of
halakhic obligations, issues of personal status and civil law.99 With regard to re-
ligious obligations, the issue of parentage is relevant for matters of the father’s
obligation to “be fruitful and multiply,”100 and the obligation of the child to
honor its parents. The personal status of the child is relevant for determining
the permissibility of certain marriages, i.e., laws against incest. In matters of
civil law, parental status may be relevant for matters of inheritance and child
maintenance laws. Therefore, the importance of determining motherhood is
broader than the issue of who will be entitled to custody.
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998).
94. Id. § 9-10-201 (2).
95. Chaim Povarsky, Regulating Advanced Reproductive Technologies: A Comparative Analysis of
Jewish and American Law, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 409. 461 (1998).
96. See infra Part IV(B).
97. The issue of how Jewish law would determine custody will be discussed infra Part IV(C).
98. See, e.g., Avraham Yitchak Halevi Calev, Who is the Mother of the Child; the Parent or She who
Gives Birth?, 5 TANCHUMIN 260 (1984). The title itself indicates that despite the fact that the guardian
or acting parent of the child is the intended parent, the issue of the natural mother’s identity is still
important.
99. See Yehoshua Ben-Meir, Legal Parenthood and Genetic Parenthood in Jewish Law, 12 JEWISH L.
ANN. 153 (1993).
100. For a thorough discussion of the commandment to be fruitful and multiply, see infra Part
IV(a).
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Jewish law consists of written law, The Bible, and oral law, all of which are
both considered to have been revealed to Moses.101 The cornerstone of the oral
law is The Talmud, which is considered binding for all followers of Jewish law.102
Since the issue of gestational surrogacy is only made possible by modern tech-
nology, there is no official singular ruling on the matter that can be derived from
The Talmud. Rather, modern day poskim (religious authorities) have issued re-
sponsa (answers to individual questions)103 and Jewish law commentators have
issued opinions on the matter based on Talmudic sources.104 When an issue is
not directly discussed either in The Torah or The Talmud, authorities will base
their opinions on analogies with accepted rulings, derive law from Talmudic or
biblical sources, or when this is not possible, they may base their opinions on ag-
gadah—the homiletic, non-normative portion of The Talmud, also known as the
philosophy of the law.105
Jewish legal authorities disagree as to whether the genetic donor or gesta-
tional surrogate is the actual mother. However, the majority of authorities con-
sider the gestational surrogate to be the legal mother of the child.106 The minor-
ity opinion is that the genetic mother is the legal mother of the child.107 Another
101. One rabbinic authority explains the oral law as follows:
It is impossible for the Torah of God to have covered all possible cases that may ever arise,
because the new situations that constantly arise in human affairs, in law, and as a result of
human enterprise are so manifold that a book cannot encompass them. Therefore, general
principles, which the Torah only briefly suggests, were revealed orally to Moses at Sinai,
so that halakhic authorities of every generation would use them to derive new laws.
MENACHEM ELON, CASE BOOK: JEWISH LAW 6 (1988) (citing JOSEPH ALBO, SEFER HA-IKKARIM [THE
BOOK OF PRINCIPLES] 3:23).
102. The Talmud was compiled during the end of the 5th century C.E. The Talmud consists of
the Mishnah and Gemara. The Mishnah is divided into six orders and although its origins are dis-
puted, the majority view maintains that it was written by Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi at the end of the 2nd
century C.E. The Gemara provides a commentary on these codified laws. There is a Babylonian
Talmud [hereinafter B. Talmud] and a Jerusalem Talmud [hereinafter J. Talmud] that use different
Gemara. While both Talmuds are used and may be influential, the Babylonian Talmud takes prece-
dence. See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW 224-27, 1091-98 (1994).
103. The responsa literature, or “case law” of the Jewish people, consists of decisions written by
diverse legal authorities in the post-Talmudic period in response to individual questions posed to
Rabbis. See ELON, supra note 102, at 1454-528. Responsa is binding only on those who ask a question
directly or for those in a community which has chosen to accept the opinions of a religious authority
upon them.
104. A commentator gives an opinion that is not binding on any particular individual case while
a posek gives an opinion in direct response to a question asked. The opinion given is then binding on
the person who asks and whomever follows the interpretation of Jewish law by that Rabbi. For a
full discussion of authority in Jewish law, see THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 96-99, 725-27 (Men-
achem Elon ed. 1975) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
105. See ELON, supra note 102, at 9-10. But see David Bleich, Maternal Identity Revisited, in JEWISH
LAW AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 106 (1997) (arguing that Jewish law interpretation
and application in new technological situations should be based on analogies to legal and not homi-
letic sources or Jewish values and ideas).
106. See Calev, supra note 98, at 260; Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, Lineage of Mothers in Transfer-
ring a Fetus to the Womb of Another, 5 TANCHUMIN 248 (1984); Ezra Bick, Ovum Donations: A Rabbinic
Conceptual Model, in JEWISH LAW AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 83, 83 (Emanuel Feld-
man & Joel Wolowelsky eds., 1997).
107. See Ya’akov Ariel, Artificial Insemination and Surrogacy, COLLECTION OF ESSAYS: MEDICAL
ETHICS AND JEWISH LAW 171 (M. Halperin & Y. Primer, eds. 1996); R. Shlomo Goren, Who is the
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opinion holds that both the gestational mother and genetic mother are consid-
ered the “mother” for matters of Jewish law.108 Still others have held that neither
is a mother in the legal sense of the term.109 Since the emphasis is not on cus-
tody, there is less of a need to determine that the child has one mother, as was
held in Calvert,110 or for the child to have any legal mother at all.
It is not in the scope of this article to discuss to discuss in detail all of the
many decisions that have been given on this issue.111 However, a discussion of
the central reasons given for the different legal determinations is important to an
understanding of the issue.
A minority of Jewish law scholars is of the opinion that the genetic mother
is the sole mother of a child born of gestational surrogacy.112 In a much-cited ar-
ticle,113 Rabbi Shlomo Goren bases his determination on an argument in The Tal-
mud in which two voices argue as to the time when souls are given.114 He con-
cludes that the soul is given from the time of counting or numbering the
intended persons and not from the time of their creation. Therefore, at the earli-
est stage possible, the time of insemination, the identity of the child is already
determined by its genetic make-up.115 He also argues that fatherhood and moth-
erhood are defined in the same manner, from the first drop of seed from both
male and female, upon fertilization.116
Rabbi Itamar Warhaftig asserts that logically, it is the egg donor and not the
surrogate mother who should be considered the mother.117 His logical basis for
this conclusion is that it is the genes of the genetic mother and father that will
determine the characteristics of the child and that the womb of the surrogate is
nothing more than the place of growth.118 Furthermore, he argues that concep-
Mother When Eggs Are Donated? HA-TZOFEH, 7 Adar I 5744 (1984); Joshua Fagenbaum. SHA’AREI
TORAH, vol. IV, no. 4 ); Prof Ze’ev Low, EMEK HALAKHAH, II (Jerusalem, 5749) (1989); Itamar
Warhaftig, 5 TANCHUMIN 268 (5744) (1984).
108. See Bleich, supra note 12, at 47.
109. R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer XV, no. 45 [hereinafter Waldenberg XV]. This
responsum originally appeared in 9 Assia 1 (Tamuz 5742) (1982)) and is reprinted in 5 Sefer Assia 84-
93 (Jerusalem, 5746) (1986)), arguing that when an embryo is created through in vitro fertilization the
result is a complete absence of natural genealogy, thus maternal identity is established only when
fertilization occurs while the ovum is yet attached to the mother’s body). However, in a later re-
sponsum when asked about the genealogy of a child born from a donor egg inseminated with the
husband’s sperm and gestated by the wife, he decides that the women who gives birth to the child is
the mother. R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer XX, no. 49; see also R. Judah Gershuni Kol
Tzofayikh 361-367 (1980)).
110. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
111. For a thorough, though not entirely up to date, collection of halakhic authorities’ decisions
and sources and reasoning they have used, see Avraham Shteinberg, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH
MEDICAL ETHICS 115-50 (1991).
112. See Shlomo Goren, Ha-Tzofeh, 7 Adar I (1984); Itamar Warhaftig, 5 TANCHUMIN 268-69
(1984).
113. R. Shlomo Goren, Ha-Tzofeh, 7 Adar I 5744 (1984).
114. B. Talmud, Sanhedrin 91(b).
115. Goren, supra note 113.
116. Id. He bases this conclusion on a number of Talmudic sources, including Nidda 31(a) and
Sanhedrin 91(b).
117. Itamar Warhaftig, supra note 107, at 68-69.
118. Id.
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tually, if not practically as of yet, gestation could even be done in a laboratory.119
In his opinion, genes are the only essential human contribution. He makes an
analogy to an agricultural dispute discussed in The Talmud.120 The Talmud dis-
cusses an olive sapling that is washed away by the river to a neighbor’s field
where it continues to grow.121 One party claims that it is his olive sapling and
thus he owns it. The other party claims that it was his land that facilitated the
tree’s growth; and therefore, he should be considered the owner. It is deter-
mined that there is a preference for the owner of the olive sapling.122 By analogy
the genetic donation of the egg is compared to the contribution of the sapling,
which establishes ownership.
The vast majority of opinions, however, claim that the surrogate mother is
the legal mother. There are four major sources from which scholars have drawn
proof that the surrogate is the legal mother of the child. The first is based on a
discussion of conversion of a woman during her pregnancy in The Talmud,123 re-
lied upon by two highly regarded Rabbinical figures: Rabbi Zalman Nechemia
Goldberg124 and Rabbi Eliezer Yehudah Calev.125 The Talmud explains that two
twin brothers, who are non-Jews, and subsequently convert, have no obligations
in chalizah or yibum, (levirate marriage), and are not obligated to refrain from
marrying each other’s wives.126 Upon conversion to Judaism, all prior familial
relationships are legally severed according to Jewish law.127
In contrast, twins who were conceived when their parents were non-Jews
and were born to a Jewish woman (she converts while she is pregnant), are not
obligated in chalizah and yibum (levirate marriage), but are obligated not to
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing B. Talmud, Baba Metzia 100(b)).
121. Id.
122. Itamar Warhaftig, supra note 107, at 68-69.
123. B. Talmud Yevamot 97(b).
124. Goldberg, supra note 106, at 252.
125. Calev, supra note 98, at 260-61. Rabbi Calev uses the same proof text as Goldberg, however
he limits the holding to a Jewish egg born to a Jewish woman. If the egg is from a non-Jewish
woman, he holds that the fetus would not be converted—for those who believe that the fetus is not
part of the mother—if the conversion of the fetus wasn’t intended. Therefore, the familial relation-
ship to the birth mother is dependent on the birth mother’s intent to convert the fetus. In the case
where there is no conversion of the fetus, i.e., in gestational surrogacy where the surrogate mother is
Jewish and the egg donor is not Jewish, the natural status of the egg donor as the mother prevails
over the Jewish law determination that the surrogate (birth mother) is the mother. In other words, if
the egg donor is non-Jewish, the child is considered non-Jewish and, therefore, Jewish law does not
determine maternity.
126. B. Talmud, Yevamot 97(b). Chalizah and Yibum are complex religious obligations. If a mar-
ried man dies leaving no children, Jewish law encourages his widowed wife to marry her deceased
husband’s brother in order to conceive children that will continue deceased’s husband’s line. If the
brother marries the wife of his deceased brother this is called Yibum. If, however, he does not want
to marry her he must release her by performing Chalizah (removal of the obligation). This obligation
is in stark contrast to the strict prohibition on a man from marrying his brother’s wife after his
brother dies, if the deceased brother did have children with his wife. In contemporary times, Yibum
is not performed; rather, the Rabbis have mandated that the proper course is Chalizah. For a thor-
ough explanation of the concepts of Yibum and Chalizah, the history of the obligation and an expla-
nation of the way they are practiced today, see PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 403-09.
127. For a full explanation of a theoretical rebirth that severs all previous familial ties upon con-
version to Judaism see Bleich, supra note 108, at 49-50.
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marry their brother’s wife.128 Rashi, a commentator on The Talmud, suggests that
the reason they are not obligated in chalizah and yibum but are obligated not to
marry each other’s wives is that the obligation of chalizah and yibum derives
from paternal lineage, and that not marrying a brother’s wife, follows from ma-
ternal lineage.129 Since fatherhood is determined at conception, and they are
now considered converts, they have severed ties to their father and are ex-
empted from obligations based on their father’s lineage. However, since moth-
erhood is established upon birth, the obligations that are derived from lineage to
their mother still hold. In conclusion, if motherhood were determined by ge-
netic input or upon conception, the conversion of the mother would have sev-
ered her ties to her children and their ties to each other.130 However, after the
twins’ birth they are still considered brothers from their maternal lineage in that
they are prohibited from marrying each other’s wives. If no familial tie existed
there would be no marital prohibition because they would not be considered
brothers at all.131 Therefore, in accordance with this source, it has been argued
that it is birth that determines motherhood.
Another Talmudic source,132 cited by Rabbi Calev133 and discussed by others
as well,134 discusses an aggadic interpretation (homiletic tale) of the biblical story
of Rachel and Leah.135 The allegorical source refers to an intra-uterine transfer of
Dinah from the womb of Rachel to the womb of Leah and an intra-uterine trans-
fer of Joseph from the womb of Leah to the womb of Rachel. Subsequent refer-
ences in scripture refer to Dinah as the daughter of Leah and Joseph as the son
of Rachel, despite the supposed switch. Ostensibly, this tale indicates that each
child has a single mother and that the mother is the birth mother, not the genetic
mother. This analogy marks parturition rather than gestation or egg donation as
the establishing variable of motherhood.
While some authorities will not use allegory in matters of determining
Jewish law,136 many other authorities have held that if the allegorical interpreta-
128. B. Talmud, Yevamot 97(b).
129. Rashi on B. Talmud, Yevamot 97(b).
130. There is considerable disagreement as to whether the children themselves also convert, or
whether they do not convert and receive their status upon birth. This disagreement arises from the
question of whether a fetus is considered to be part of the mother or a separate entity. For this article
it is not crucial to decide this question because the child’s relationship to its mother would be sev-
ered if motherhood was determined upon conception—because upon her conversion she would no
longer be related to her children. For a discussion of this disagreement, see Calev, supra note 98, and
Goldberg, supra note 106.
131. But see Yehoshua Ben-Meir, In vitro Fertilization, the Relations of the Fetus to the Surrogate
Mother and the Biological Mother, 41 ASIA 25 (1987) (arguing that this proof is only valid for those who
agree that a child is a part of the mother’s body, which is not a conclusion accepted by all authori-
ties); Ezra Bick, Surrogate Motherhood, 7 TECHUMIN 266 (1984) (arguing that this source only proves a
mother-child relationship if the gestating mother is also she who produced the egg).
132. B. Talmud Tractate Nida 31(a).
133. See Calev, supra note 98, at 266-67 (using the example of Rachel and Leah to show that there
can only be one mother and she is the one who gives birth).
134. See Shteinberg, supra note 111, 134-35; R. Moshe Solovethick, OR HA-MIZRAH [LIGHT OF THE
EAST] 125 (1981).
135. See Targum Yonatan, Genesis 30:21.
136. See Bleich, supra note 12, at 50.
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tion does not conflict with other legal sources, it is acceptable to learn from these
sources.137
A third Talmudic source used to demonstrate the legal standing of the birth
mother is an aggadic source from the Book of Esther.138 The Babylonian Talmud,
Megillah 13(a), notes the redundancy inherent in the phrases of the Book of
Esther “for she did not have a father or a mother” and “upon the death of her
father and mother.” This indicates that the second phrase is designed to empha-
size that Esther did not have a father or mother for even a single day. The Tal-
mud explains that her father died as soon as her mother conceived and that her
mother perished upon her birth; and therefore, she never had a mother or a fa-
ther.139
In his article, Rabbi Nechemiah Goldberg brings the interpretation of this
tale by Rabbi Joseph Engel,140 who concludes from this source that men and
women create parental relations in distinct ways.141 Rabbi Engel argues that a
fetus can have a father while it is still in the womb, but the motherhood relation-
ship is not determined until the birth of the child.142 Rabbi Engel explains that
the reason that Esther never had a mother is that during the pregnancy the fetus
is considered to be part of its mother.143 Therefore, only parturition establishes
motherhood, in contrast to the determination of fatherhood.144 He emphasizes
that motherhood and fatherhood are essentially different and are established by
different factors.145
Rabbi Yehoshua Ben-Meir also concludes that the gestational mother is the
legal mother under Jewish law and he uses yet another argument to draw this
conclusion.146 He argues that the identity of the mother can be derived from The
Talmud’s determination that during the first 40 days of its formation, the embryo
is considered to be only water.147 He concludes that we can relate to the implant
of fertilized eggs “as if it were a medicinal potion given to the woman as a
treatment against barrenness—fertilized water.”148 Since the fertilized egg is not
137. See Shevut Ya’akov, Pt. 2:178; Mishneh Halachot, Pt. 2:44. But see Ben-Meir, supra note 131,
at 26 n.8 (bringing other halakhic opinions that one should never learn from aggadic sources).
138. B. Talmud, Megillah 13(a).
139. Id.
140. Goldberg, supra note 106, at 252 (citing Joseph Engel, BEIT HA’OSAR, erech av [The Treasury]
§ 12, Pt. 4).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (literal translation: “the fetus is the thigh of his mother”)
144. Id.
145. Goldberg, supra note 106.
146. Ben-Meir, supra note 99, at 153.
147. Id. at 165.
The daughter of a priest who has relations with an Israelite continues to eat terumah [(10%
of all vegetation grown given to family members of a Cohen- a priest from the tribe of
Cohen); If she is carrying a child of a man from the tribe of Israel, then she is no longer al-
lowed to eat terumah. This raises the issue of when the daughter of a Cohen is considered
to be carrying the child.] According to Rav Hisda: ‘She should immerse herself and then
eat terumah until the fortieth day after conception . . . for if she is pregnant, it is considered
to be mere water until the fortieth day.’
Id. (citing B. Talmud, Tractate Yevamot 69(b)).
148. Id. at 165-66.
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considered to have an identity until the 40th day and in vitro fertilization will
occur before that time, the birth mother has the legal status of mother.
Rabbi David Bleich summarizes and discusses the Jewish law decisions is-
sued in the last decade. Rabbi Bleich concludes that, “the preponderance of the
evidence adduced from Rabbinic sources demonstrates that the consensus of
Rabbinic opinion is that a maternal-filial relationship is generated between the
gestational mother and the child, despite the absence of any genetic relationship,
by virtue of parturition alone.”149 Rabbi Bleich argues, however, that while the
majority of sources hold that the birth mother is the legal mother, it is necessary
to be cautions in the face of uncertainty. He therefore believes that both mothers
should be considered legal mothers.150
Rabbi Ezra Bick argues that this issue cannot be determined definitively
from the sources; rather, he maintains that the whole issue demands a more
broad conceptual approach.151 He argues, “Essentially, this question is not sus-
ceptible to the classic halakhic approach of analogy with an existent halakhic rul-
ing. Not only does a “preponderance” of halakhic sources not exist in favor of
parturition as the maternal determinant, practically speaking, no halakhic sources
exist for this or any competing candidate for the determinant.”152 He argues that
while the sources may relate to the issue of determining motherhood, they do
not do so conclusively and the laws derived are speculative.153 Rabbi Bick in-
stead turns to deriving the identity of the mother, “from the general conceptual
framework of the Sages concerning conception, on the assumption that, in the
absence of negative evidence, the proper legal definition of conception in regard
to the determination of parenthood will be congruent with that general frame-
work.”154 This method of deriving law is contested,155 but does find support in
Jewish thought, particularly when dealing with ethical issues for which no legal
precedent is readily available.156
149. Id.
150. Bleich, supra note 12, at 166.
151. Bick, supra note 106, at 85.
152. Id. at 84.
153. Id. at 84-88. Rabbi Bick argues that the analogies used are imperfect and points out a num-
ber of logical flaws, such as the major proof used about the women who converts while carrying
twins. Bick argues that this proof is flawed because in the case of a pregnant convert, the determi-
nant of conception has been annulled by the conversion (because conversion annuls all familiar rela-
tions). No such annulment occurs in surrogacy. He also argues that the case of the pregnant convert
only proves that familial relations are determined at birth, not that birth determines familial rela-
tions. The maternal relationship could have been caused by conception but only becomes estab-
lished when the child is born. In addition, even if birth alone determines maternity, it might be ar-
gued that genetic continuity is a necessary condition for such a determination. Id. at 84-87. He also
argues that the proof from the story of Rachel and Leah is not only dubious because it is from an ag-
gadic source, but also because it is not clearly discussed in the text of Genesis whether Dina was con-
sidered the legal daughter of Leah or whether she was known as such because Leah raised her.
Surely, Leah and Rachel were unaware of this theoretical intrauterine transfer. But see BLEICH, supra
note 105 (defending the traditional halakhic analogies).
154. Bick, supra note 106, at 96.
155. See BLEICH, supra note 105, at 114 (responding to Bick’s article supra note 106).
156. This method is similar to basing a decision on aggadah, which is commonly used when there
are a lack of legal sources. However, it can be differentiated because it encompasses a second level
of abstraction. Rabbi Bick is not only basing the determination on a homiletic source, he is going
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Rabbi Bick explores a more general approach to childbirth and the roles of
men and women in creating children to determine the Jewish approach to the
issue.157 Ultimately, he adopts the view that the surrogate mother is the legal
mother.158 Rabbi Bick first explains that the easiest conceptual solution to the
problem would be biological, based on the scientific knowledge that both a
woman and a man contribute seed to the creation of a child.159 However, since
the Talmudic sources do not mention the female ovum, to the degree that the
Rabbis of The Talmud had a concept of motherhood, such a concept must be de-
finable without reference to the ovum.160 Instead, he shapes what he terms the
“agricultural model” with references in rabbinic literature to the principle that
the female is identified with receptivity. One such example is as follows:
R. Levi said: the upper waters are male and the lower female. The one says to
the other, “Receive us; you are God’s creatures and we are His messengers.”
Immediately, they receive them, as is written (Isa. 45:8), “[Drop down, heavens,
from above, and let the skies pour down righteousness,] let the earth open”—as
a female opening herself to a male—“and be fruitful with salvation”—they pro-
create.161
This excerpt is an interpretation of Genesis, which clearly views woman as a re-
ceiver, who by receiving becomes fruitful.
Ultimately, Rabbi Bick asks: “What is the difference between an ‘agricul-
tural’ model and a ‘biological’ model of motherhood?”162 His answer neatly
sums up the most significant difference between the secular law resolutions on
the issue of motherhood discussed above, and the Jewish resolution on the issue:
The latter (biological model) either denies or at least attaches no importance to
the differences between male and female. They both donate genetic material
and together they constitute the embryo. Maternity and paternity are identical;
simply the different names we give to the same position when filled by mem-
bers of the two sexes, . . . The former model (agricultural model), while positing
parallel roles, it is only through the joint participation of the two that an embryo
further by first deriving general principles from these sources and then applying them to an entirely
new scenario—and the two methods are certainly comparable. There are many circumstances in
which the only source for halakhah is reason or the consent of the people. There are also instances
where the source of the law is simply equity, an understanding of justice. See AVI SAGI, JUDAISM:
BETWEEN RELIGION AND MORALITY 116-20 (1999) (arguing that Jewish law is derived not from a sin-
gular but from a variety of conceptual sources including reason and consent).
Rabbi Bick offers another example of what he considers deriving a law from a determination of
what Talmudic Sages might have said: “The different opinions concerning the use of electricity on
Shabbat reflect such as process. Although the definition of boneh (building) may be derived from the
Talmud, the Hazon Ish’s extension of it to electricity is based on a completely new conceptualization
of the nature of an electric current, which obviously has no basis in the Talmud itself. The Hazon Ish
has a model for electricity and tries to decide what the Talmud Sages would have said about it.”
Bick, supra note 106, at 105 n.19.
157. Bick, supra note 106, at 89-96.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 89.
160. Id.
161. JACOB NEUSNER, GENESIS RABBA: A JEWISH COMMENTARY TO THE BOOK OF GENESIS: A NEW
AMERICAN TRANSLATION 13:13 (1985).
162. Bick, supra note 106, at 101.
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can be formed, nonetheless defines the roles in a radically different, almost op-
posite way.163
Rabbi Bick concludes that a conception of the relationship between man
and woman, which recognizes the biological differences of men and women,
corresponds most accurately to Jewish legal philosophy.164 Therefore, it makes
sense to denote parturition as that which defines motherhood and seed as that
which defines fatherhood. He argues that it makes sense to give status to that
which makes a man different from a woman, since such differences are given
much credence in Jewish law.
Rabbi Bick offers a conceptual orientation to the issue from a broad over-
view of Jewish law. He posits that Jewish law should give special consideration
to the legal status of the surrogate as the birth mother due to the law’s sensitiv-
ity to, and emphasis on, the differences between men and women. This under-
standing provides a broader, philosophical background to the more legalistic
determinations that have been made.
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ISRAELI SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AGREEMENTS LAW
A. The Jewish Law Determination of Motherhood and the New Israeli
Surrogacy Law
The Surrogate Agreements Law contains many provisions that attempt to
incorporate aspects of Jewish law in order to avoid problems that might arise
with the religious communities in Israel. Specifically, the law takes into consid-
eration the Jewish stigma of mamzer.165 A mamzer is a child born as a result of an
adulterous relationship between a married woman and a man who is not her
husband or through incestuous relations.166 If a child is deemed a mamzer, the
child is not permitted to marry under Jewish law except to another mamzer.
Since the Rabbinical courts have jurisdiction over personal status in Israel, in-
cluding marriage, a mamzer would not be able to marry in Israel. Furthermore,
if the person attempts to marry in some other forum, it would create tension
between the religious and secular communities in Israel.
163. Id. at 101.
164. Id. at 102; see also infra Part VI for a discussion of gender difference in Jewish law.
165. It should be noted that incorporating religious considerations into Israeli law in the related
area of artificial insemination by a donor (AID) has not been so readily accepted. According to Jew-
ish law, if the procedure is permitted at all, which is a matter of serious disagreement, the sperm do-
nor’s identity would certainly have to be made public. However, such information is not public, and
there is a considerable threat of mamzerut due to the widespread use of the procedure. The only
regulation that has been passed in this area is The Public Health (Sperm Bank) Regulations, 1979,
K.T. 39996, 1448. Artificial insemination is practiced regularly in Israel, although the law does not
mandate public registration of the male donor. See Michael Korinaldi, The Legal Status of a Child Born
of Artificial Insemination from a Donor or from an Egg Donor, 18 SHNATON HAMISHPAT HAIVRI 295
(1995); Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 34, at 334-35.
166. The stigma of mamzerut does not derive from relationships of a married man with another
woman because according to Jewish law, before it was outlawed by a rabbinic decree a man could
marry more than one woman. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 435; NOAM ZOHAR, ALTERNATIVES
IN JEWISH BIOETHICS 78-80 (1997).
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Furthermore, due to Jewish law’s general opposition to artificial insemina-
tion by a donor, the use of a donor sperm is prohibited and the father must be
the genetic father of the child.167 In addition, the surrogate mother and the ovum
donor must be of the same religion as the intended mother in order to accom-
modate those Jewish law authorities that have expressed uncertainty as to the
religion of the child born from a surrogate, whether the child takes on the relig-
ion of the ovum donor or the surrogate.168 A number of commentators have ex-
plored and analyzed the effect that these halakhic caveats have had on the Surro-
gacy Law.169
However, the law does not reflect consideration for the majority Jewish law
position that the surrogate mother is the legal mother. As discussed in depth
above, the intended parents are considered the legal parents.170 The surrogate
mother’s identity must be officially recorded according to the Israeli law, but she
does not retain any rights to the child that would necessitate an adoption, nor
does she have more than a very narrow right of withdrawal from the contract.171
More significant than the Israeli law’s lack of consideration for the Jewish
perspective on this matter is the religious authorities’ own antipathy. It seems
reasonable to assume that since the majority view in Jewish law is that the ges-
tational mother is the legal mother, Jewish authorities would object to surrogate
agreements that forcefully alienate the legal mother from her natural child.172
This is especially the case considering Jewish law’s emphasis on biology and
status.173
A number of rabbinic authorities have voiced objections to the surrogate
motherhood process due to misgivings about alienating child-rearing from the
sanctity of marriage and the marital bed,174 out of concern about the technology
that facilitates it.175 However, published responsa have not raised objections to
the surrogate motherhood process based on the alienation of the natural mother.
In Israel, surrogate motherhood has been expressly permitted by some of the
most respected rabbinic authorities. Both the Sephardic Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Bak-
167. Id.; Surrogate Agreements Law, 1996 S.H. 1577 §2(4); see infra Part VI for an explanation of
AID and Jewish law’s opposition to it.
168. See supra note 125 for a discussion of this concern. This was confirmed as a halakhic consid-
eration by Dr. Halperin. See infra note 193.
169. See Shalev, supra note 34, at 64-76; see also Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 34, at 333-35.
170. See Surrogate Agreements Law, 1996 S.H. 1577, §10(a).
171. Id. § 13a, 29. Section 13(a) discusses the limited right to withdraw from the contract, and
section 29 addresses the requirement to register the birth mother for purposes of lineage. The reper-
cussions for not accounting for the status of the birth mother in Jewish law are less precarious than
the other religious considerations because it will not create problems of illegitimacy, as long the
identity of the birth mother is recorded and can be checked, which is required by the law.
172. See Noam Zohar, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood, 2 S’VARA [Reason] 13, 18
n.10 (1991).
173. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Moshe Tendler, Infertility Management: Cure or Ill, 17/334 SH’MA 109-10 (1987).
175. See, e.g., Waldenberg XV, supra note 109; see also Avraham Sofer Avraham, NISHMAT
AVRAHAM Eben Ha’ezer [THE LAWS OF PROCREATION] § 5, at 184 (1982) (citing Rav Shalom Elyashiv
and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as condemning in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood).
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shi Doron, and Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, a Rabbinical court judge and
highly regarded halakhic posek, have given their approval to the law.176
In a private meeting with the Surrogate Agreements Approvals Committee
appointed by the law, Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg explicitly condoned
the law and made no mention of the surrogate mother’s rights or claims to the
child.177 When asked by the committee who is the mother in a case of gestational
surrogacy where the intended mother has donated her ovum, Rabbi Goldberg
responded that this is a new issue and must be determined on the basis of
analogies to related sources of halakhah, but cannot be determined with full cer-
tainty.178 Therefore, he insisted that both mothers need to be treated as mothers
for the sake of lineage to avoid any determination of mamzerut.179 When asked
whether he would permit a woman that sought his approval to use a surrogate
mother, he answered that he would allow it if a woman could not have a child
otherwise.180 Rabbi Borshtein, Director of the Puah Institute of Halakhah and
Reproductive Technology in Jerusalem, has stated that under his guidance a
number of women have received private permission from various Orthodox
halakhic authorities, permitting the procedure and contract as it is designated in
the Israeli law.181 In fact, the first couple to use the Israeli Surrogate Contracts
law was a religious couple.182
While Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg’s conversation with the Approv-
als Committee is the only written acceptance of the Israeli law by a renowned
authority of Jewish law, there is an understanding among the religious commu-
nities that such procedures may be permissible, depending on a couple’s specific
circumstances and with direct approval of a Rabbinic authority.
In U.S. courts, the defining factors of motherhood have direct bearing on
the legal determination of who has rights to the child. In traditional surrogacy,
where the surrogate mother is considered the legal mother, the courts and many
state legislatures have made such contracts illegal or void as against public pol-
icy, provided an option for no cause withdrawal, or required a custody hearing,
as was the case in In re Baby M.183 In gestational surrogacy, where the intended
176. Telephone Interview with Dr. Avraham Shteinberg, author of THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HALAKHA AND MEDICINE (1998) and Israel Prize Winner (June 15, 2000). There is no official record-
ing of the approval by Rabbi Bakshi Doron, but the law passed with the consent of the Chief Rabbin-
ate of Israel. Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, On Donating Eggs, Surrogacy, Frozen Sperm of a Single Man,
and Using Sperm of the Dead, 17 ASIA A-B 45 (Spring 1999).
177. Goldberg, supra note 176, at 45-47 (1999).
178. Id at 45-46.
179. Id.
180. Id at 46-47.
181. Telephone Interview with Rabbi Borshtein, Director of the Puah Institute of Halakhah and
Reproductive Technology (June 16, 2000).
182. Id. The identities of the participants in the surrogate motherhood agreements are kept
largely confidential in accordance with the Surrogate Agreements Law, supra note 15, § 19(c). In fact,
§ 19(c) dictates that “if any person makes public anything said at sessions of the Approvals Com-
mittee or any documents presented to it, or the name, identity or anything else likely to let the birth
mother, the intended parents or the child be identified” without a court order, he may be imprisoned
for one year.
183. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
LAUFER-UKELES_FMT.DOC 06/09/03 4:38 PM
GESTATION: WORK FOR HIRE OR THE ESSENCE OF MOTHERHOOD? 115
mother is considered the legal mother, U.S. courts and legislators have not cre-
ated the same impediments.
While in U.S. law, the identity of the mother is directly connected to the
permissibility of surrogate motherhood, Jewish law authorities, in contrast, have
not focused on the problem of subjugating a natural determination of mother-
hood and on the lack of provisions for the legal mother in Jewish law in gesta-
tional surrogate motherhood. Rather, they have condoned the law or con-
demned it for other reasons.
The next sections will explore possible reasons for this difference. One pos-
sible reason for the lack of relevance of the natural mother in Jewish law is that
Jewish law, unlike U.S. law, would uphold and enforce surrogate motherhood
agreements that allow the legal mother to waive her motherhood rights before
the birth of the child. The acceptance of the contract would make the issue of
who is the legal or natural mother prior to the contract irrelevant, except for
purposes of recording the natural mother’s identity. Custody of the child would
then be legally transferred to the intended parents under Jewish law. Although
exploration of this contractual option is necessary to fully understand why sur-
rogacy has been accepted despite the mother’s legal rights under Jewish law, it
is important to note that the legal authorities who have permitted such contracts
have not provided the validity of the contract as a basis for their affirmation.
The next section will consider whether Jewish contract law would allow a
surrogate motherhood contract to be enforced despite the surrogate’s legal
status of mother. Part IV will discuss other aspects of Jewish law that might
lead authorities to overlook the rights of the legal mother.
B. Is the Surrogacy Agreement Obligating the Birth Mother to Transfer the
Child to the Intended Mother Binding Under Jewish Law?
1. Renting a Womb or Baby-Selling
In considering whether or not a contract for the transfer of a child is bind-
ing under Jewish law, one must first characterize the nature of the contract. This
article assumes that the contract is commercial as is set forth in the Israeli Surro-
gacy Law.184 One option for characterizing the contract is as an obligation of the
birth mother to surrender her rights to raise the child and to agree to the adop-
tion of the child by the intended parents. Alternately, the contract can be
viewed as renting the womb of the surrogate mother as an incubator for the in-
tended parents’ child.
However, this second characterization of the contract is not consistent with
the Jewish law view of motherhood. The surrogate mother is more than just a
womb for rent according to Jewish law. As stated by the majority opinion, she is
in fact the legal mother, and therefore the child in her womb does not simply
belong to someone else while she temporarily nurtures it to viability.
184. Surrogate Agreements Law, supra note 15, at § 6. Other jurisdictions have permitted only
voluntary non-commercial agreements. Non-commercial agreements avoid the ethical complica-
tions of selling babies or renting a womb, while maintaining the potential for surrogate motherhood
in the framework of an altruistic agreement. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, -160(B)(4) (Michie
1995).
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In Jewish law, baby-selling law may be less problematic than in other legal
systems. Prohibitions against the selling of a person in Jewish law relate to the
selling of a person into servitude.185 In surrogacy arrangements, the child is not
sold into slavery; rather, the right to raise the child is transferred. The difference
in sensibilities between Western ethics and Jewish law should be understood in
the context of a different perspective on parenting. Raising a child is viewed as
an obligation and not a right under Jewish law, so it is not expected that one
would pay for this duty.186 Ostensibly, the prohibition against receiving money
for the sale of persons is based on a fear of control over another human being in
slavery and not a blanket prohibition against transferring a child for considera-
tion.187
Rabbi David Bleich argues that baby selling is not prohibited under Jewish
law.188 He brings an example to illustrate this point from Sefer Hasidim.189 Sefer
Hasidim advises parents that have lost a previous child to change their names
and thereby their identities in order to divert the negative heavenly decree on
their persons.190 The procedure he recommends is to conceptually sell their in-
fants who have died to a friend for a nominal fee, thereby diverting the negative
history from them.191 This recommendation assumes the permissibility of selling
of a child.
Western morality tends to view a surrogacy contract as a contract for serv-
ices, whereas Jewish law is more apt to view the contract as one for the transfer
of the child, as the gestational mother is the legal mother and baby selling is not
as legally problematic.
2. A Contract for That Which is Not Yet in Existence
Characterizing the surrogacy contract as an obligation to surrender the
child to adoption before its birth does create a number of legal problems in Jew-
ish law. The first is the concept of “dvar shelo ba le’olem” (“things that do not ex-
ist in the world”). Contracts for objects or items of value that do not yet exist, or
are not yet in the possession of the seller, are not recognized under Jewish law.192
In his capacity as advisor to the Ministry of Health, Rabbi Dr. Mordechai Hal-
185. See Leviticus 25:39-42 (“If thy brother who dwells by thee be grown poor, and be sold to thee,
thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bondservant . . . he . . . shall serve thee until the year of the
Jubilee, and then shall . . . he return to his own family. For they are my servants, whom I brought
out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bondsmen.”).
186. See infra Part V(C) (child custody).
187. See Povarsky, supra note 95, at 454.
188. David Bleich, Surrogate Motherhood, in JERUSALEM CITY OF LAW AND JUSTICE 406-07 (1996)
(citing RABBI Sefer Hasidim No. 245 (Jerusalem, 5720) (1960)).
189. Id.
190. Id. The theory is that as a different person, the parent is entitled to a new hearing against
the heavenly decree. On rehearing, the heavenly court may find some new merit, presumably not of
sufficient strength to abrogate an already-entered judgment, but possibly sufficient to prevent the
entry of a newly-formed unfavorable decree. Id.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., B. Talmud, Bava Metzia 33(b); Moses Maimonides, MISHNEH TORAH, SEFER KINYAN
[The Book of Acquisition] 22:1; CHOSHEN MISHPAT, SHULCHAN ARUCH 209:4 (relating to civil law
and business ethics); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 248-49; GOLD, supra note 205, at 122.
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perin believes that this concept would nullify a surrogate motherhood agree-
ment in Jewish law.193
However, most Jewish authorities believe that something not yet in exis-
tence can be charged as an obligation or lien on a person in favor of the obligee,
rather than a transfer of rights to the object itself, which is not yet in existence.194
Since the lien is not on the object but an obligation on a person, who does exist,
it is considered valid. Dr. Chaim Povarsky recommends viewing the surrogacy
agreement not as an obligation to transfer a child not yet in existence, but rather
as an obligation on the part of the surrogate mother to transfer the child to the
father’s sole custody, thereby avoiding the problem of the impermissibility of
contracting for things that are not yet in existence (dvar shelo ba le’olam).195
3. Contracts for Personal Services
However, an obligation upon the mother to relinquish the child to the sole
custody of the father and his wife is fraught with further difficulty. Since the
contract can not be characterized as a right upon the child itself, but rather, as an
obligation upon the mother, such an obligation must be characterized as one for
personal services, the service of providing the child. Unlike tangible goods or
money to which a person has a right of property, the gestational mother does
not have a similar right to a child; she has a duty to raise the child.196 Therefore,
in a contract for a child, unlike an obligation for goods, she is obliging herself to
perform a service, such as the transfer of the child, not a relegation of her rights
to the child, because the intended parents cannot place a lien on a right to
something the mother does not have.
However, a future obligation to perform personal services or physical acts
is of questionable validity under Jewish law. In western legal systems, a prom-
ise to perform a service, if there is consideration, would be valid as a right to sue
a person to perform, or pay damages where specific performance is not permit-
ted. Dr. Povarsky explains that in Jewish law, it is generally accepted that an
obligation to work or perform a service or a physical act does not establish a lien
against a person of the obligor, as does a proprietary obligation or debt.197 This
193. Mordechai Halperin, Surrogate Mother, 7 REFUAH U’MISHPAT [MEDICINE AND LAW] 47 (1997).
194. An obligation on a person is called shiabud haguf (a lien on a body) as opposed to a right to
property. See Shulchan Aruch, CHOSHEN MISHPAT 60:6; Tosafot on B. Talmud, Ketubot 54(b); Asher
(Rosh) on B. Talmud, Ketubot 54(b); Moses Sofer (Chatam Sofer) on B. Talmud, Ketubot 54(b). For
secondary sources explaining this matter see Povarsky, supra note 95, at 457-58; PRINCIPLES, supra
note 104, at 249-50.
195. Povarsky, supra note 95, at 452.
196. See infra Part IV(C) on custody in Jewish law.
197. See Povarsky, supra note 95, at 452. An obligation to perform a certain act may refer either to
the service involved in the performance of the act or to the carrying out of the act itself. Insofar as
the obligation refers to the service, the obligation does not establish a lien against the person of the
obligor because a lien for performing services is regarded as a kind of slavery. This principle is
based on the talmudic ruling in which an employee is allowed to quit his work at any time, subject
to damages he might have to pay the employer for actual losses the latter suffered as a result of the
employee’s resignation. The Talmud quotes Scripture stating, “For the children of Israel are slaves
unto me, they are my slaves. . . .” Leviticus 25:55. The repetitious statement “they are my slaves”
was interpreted to mean, “They are my slaves but not slaves to other slaves”; that is, Israelites are
required not to enslave themselves [hereinafter the Slavery Argument]. See B. Talmud, Bava Metzia
10(a); Asher (Rosh) on Bava Metzia 10(a). There is a general attitude in Jewish law that any engage-
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is because a lien against a person to perform an act is considered a kind of slav-
ery, which cannot be undertaken through such a contract.198 A contract that does
not create a proprietary obligation is considered kinyan devarim (“the appropria-
tion of words”) and is invalid. In an agreement between two parties to perform
some specific service, or a certain action, either side can back out of the agree-
ment until the moment of its performance.199
However, it is contested whether an independent contractor is included
under those who cannot make a binding contract for personal services.200 The
surrogate mother would presumably be considered an independent contractor
because she is hired to perform a specific service, not for a period of time. Ac-
cording to Rabbi Yaakov, a prominent 12th century Tosafist scholar also known
as Rabbeinu Tam, an independent contractor—as opposed to an employee—
cannot retract from his obligation to perform services because an independent
contractor is not regarded as a slave.201 The Rosh, another medieval halakhic
authority, argues that such a contract cannot be binding on an independent
contractor or an employee.202 Other scholars have agreed with the Rosh.203
The majority of authorities would agree that an employee might back out
of his contract without consequence if the employer will not suffer irretrievable
loss. There is, however, disagreement about the ability of an independent con-
tractor to back out of a contract.204 It is therefore not clear whether a surrogate
mother’s obligation to transfer the child would be binding upon her. It is a diffi-
cult question that necessitates extensive rabbinical analysis.
4. Meeting of the Minds
In addition to the problems with the surrogacy contract stated above, there
is a further question of whether this contract is truly a meeting of the minds, or
in Hebrew, “asmachta.” According to Jewish law, a contract is only valid if it can
ment of a laborer, even of his own free will, is a form of restraint on personal liberty, thus the laborer
has special rights for his protection, B. Talmud, Bava Metzia 10(a); 77(a)
198. See discussion supra note 197 (regarding Leviticus 25:55).
199. In the Talmud, the following example is given: if two neighbors share a fence and want to
divide it between themselves, they must make a mutual agreement. If they agree to divide the fence
on the following day according to an agreed-upon measurement, they have not created any obliga-
tion until they act upon the agreement. See B. Talmud, Baba Batra 3:1.
200. For employees, labor laws under Jewish law provide that if something will definitely be lost
if the worker does not fulfill his obligation under the labor agreement then the worker, whether an
employee or independent contractor, will be liable for damages. However, if the worker backs out
and the employer does not have to lose any money, but only loses out on the contract, it is generally
agreed upon that an employee does not have any obligation to the employer. B. Talmud, Bava Met-
zia 77(a).
201. See Povarsky, supra note 95, at 453 (citing Tosafot, Bava Metzia 48(a)). The surrogate mother
would be considered an independent contractor because she is hired not for a specified period of
time, but to complete a specified “project.” See PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 310 (citing Maggid
Mishneh Sekhirut 9:4).
202. Piske HaRosh, B. Talmud, Baba Metzia 77(a).
203. Other scholars who have agreed with the Rosh include Rabbi Itzhak (one of the Tosafist
scholars known as the “Re”), cited by Rabbi Nissim (“Ran”) in his commentary on Bava Metzia 48(a);
Rashba and Ran, cited by Nimukei Yoseph in his commentary on Rabbi Alfasi’s codification, Bava
Metzia, ch. 4 (with reference to the talmudic discussion in B. Talmud Bava Metzia 48(a)).
204. See Povarsky, supra note 95, at 451-53.
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be reasonably presumed that the intentions of both parties are serious, deliber-
ate, and final.205
The Israeli Surrogate Agreements Law is careful to provide safeguards for
full and meaningful agreement.206 The Committee must make certain, before
approving the surrogacy agreement, that all parties entering the agreement have
done so of their free will, and understand its significance and consequence. Ad-
ditionally, there must be no misgivings about the health of the birth mother, or
the child that will be born, or the rights of either of the parties.207
Despite safeguards, it is reasonable to doubt that a true meeting of the
minds can occur with regard to the transfer of a child not yet born. Rabbi Gold
argues that due to the vast difference in the psychological perspective of a
mother before a baby is born and after it is born, the doctrine of asmachta would
likely invalidate the contract.208 Doubts have been expressed by Dr. Halperin, a
member of the Aloni Commission, as to the possibility of fulfilling such condi-
tions.209 In interview for an Israeli newspaper, he states that he is not sure that
there is even a possibility of ascertaining whether people really understand all
the consequences and significance of the surrogacy contract.210 There also can be
no guarantees against mental or physical harm.211 He goes on to imply that un-
der the standards of the Israeli law itself, it is unlikely that any surrogacy con-
tract could be approved.212 Despite the safeguards, it is possible that the strict
Jewish law requirement of a full meeting of the minds would preclude the en-
forceability of contract to surrender one’s own child made before its birth.
In conclusion, it is not simple to assert the enforceability of a contract to
transfer custody of a child born of a surrogate mother but it is possible. In
making decisions about whether to hold these contracts enforceable, Jewish le-
gal authorities may be inclined to characterize the contract in a more intuitive
way, either as a contract for gestational services, or as a contract for the baby
that does not yet exist—both of which would not be enforceable under Jewish
law. In addition, ensuring true consent on the part of the mother is exacerbated
by the fact that she is the legal mother under Jewish law, and her consent is
questionable under the doctrine of asmachta. Based on the aforementioned legal
obstacles to approving such agreements, those commentators who have dis-
cussed the matter have surmised that such contracts would not be enforceable.213
205. MICHAEL GOLD, AND HANNAH WEPT 122 (1988). For an in depth discussion of “Asmachta,”
see BARYAHU LIFSHITZ, PROMISE: OBLIGATION AND ACQUISITION IN JEWISH LAW (1988).
206. Surrogate Motherhood Law § 4: 3,4 (1996).
207. Id. § 5.
208. See GOLD, supra note 205, at 122-23; see also David Feldman, Determining When We Have Gone
Too Far 17/334 Sh’ma 108 (1987) (arguing that, after giving birth, a woman is never of the same state
of mind as before birth).
209. Orna Landau, Comprehensive Law, Version 2000, HA’ARETZ D1 (March 12, 1998).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW (MISHPAT IVRI) CASES AND MATERIALS 743-44 (1999);
Hlomit Joy Oz, Genetic Mother vs. Surrogate Mother: Which Mother Does the Law Recognize? A Compari-
son of Jewish Law and American Law and England’s Law, 6 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 438, 448-49 (2000); Noam
Zohar, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood, 2 S’VARA 13, 18 note 10 (1991); see also GOLD,
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While not conclusive, such analyses are indicative of the substantial Jewish law
basis for a determination that surrogate motherhood contracts should not be le-
gal. In any event, careful analysis would be needed to explain how the enforce-
ability of the surrogacy arrangements justifies permitting the waiving of mater-
nal affiliation.
The following section will discuss some additional principles of Jewish law
that might lead authorities to permit surrogate motherhood agreements,
whether they are willing to state definitively that such contracts in and of them-
selves are valid under Jewish law. Such justifications go farther to explain why
legal authorities have condoned the Israeli Surrogacy Agreements Law despite
the Jewish identification of the birth mother as the mother.
IV. FURTHER PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW RELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION
OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE ISRAELI SURROGATE AGREEMENTS
LAW PROVISIONS UNDER JEWISH LAW
Besides the potential enforceability of the surrogate motherhood contract,
there are other reasons that might underlie a Jewish legal acceptance of surro-
gate motherhood arrangements. These principles include: the command to be
fruitful and multiply incumbent upon men, the absence of the concept of adop-
tion in Jewish law, and Jewish law’s focus on obligations as opposed to rights in
matters of custody.
A. The Commandment to be Fruitful and Multiply
The Commandment to be fruitful and multiply is derived from passages in
Genesis.214 The Rabbis have interpreted this commandment to be applicable
only to men and to be fulfilled with the birth of two children.215
In a certain form, surrogate motherhood was practiced in biblical times.
Abraham’s wife Sara and Jacob’s wives, Rachel and Leah, all enlisted other
women on their quests to have children. Rachel said to her husband Jacob, “Be-
hold my maid, Bilhah, go in unto her, and that she may bear upon my knees,
and I also obtain children by her.”216 However, the difference between these
scenarios and modern day surrogate motherhood is that under biblical law, a
man could have many wives or concubines; the term adultery in The Bible refers
exclusively to infidelity committed by a married woman. In these biblical sto-
ries, the surrogate mother was herself part of the household of the male with
whom she slept. Therefore, the woman was a surrogate wife, not a surrogate by
contract. She did not have to give up her child; rather, she agreed to raise the
children in the household of the father and his primary wives.
supra note 205, at 120-27 (concluding that Jewish tradition would likely not consider a surrogacy
contract legally binding, but would consider it morally binding).
214. Genesis 1:28, “And God blessed them and said to them be fruitful and multiply. . . .”
215. Mishnah Yevamot VI: 6; B. Talmud, Yevamot 61(b); Sefer Hachinuch, Commandment 1 (based
on Genesis 1:28, “And God blessed them and said to them be fruitful and multiply.”) The details of
this commandment, how many children and of what sex, is discussed in the B. Talmud, Tractate
Yevamot, 6: 61, p. 2 and in Berachot, 15:1.
216. Genesis 30:3.
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Professor Pinhas Shifman stresses the importance of the obligation to pro-
create in the Jewish authorities’ discussions of new reproductive technologies.217
According to The Talmud, if a man marries a woman who fails to give birth
within ten years, he must take additional steps to fulfill his duty of procrea-
tion.218 He is required either to divorce his first wife or to take a second wife.219
However, in 1028, Rabbeinu Tam prohibited polygamy, as well as divorce with-
out the consent of the woman.220 Therefore, according to the tenets of modern
Judaism, it is no longer acceptable to take another wife in order to fulfill the
commandment to be fruitful and multiply, nor is it acceptable to have extra-
marital relations.221 However, using artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization
to fulfill this command may be not only acceptable, but even a religious duty.222
Prof. Shifman postulates that according to this analysis, “[T]he procurement of
surrogate motherhood would be looked upon as a religious duty.”223
Regardless of whether such treatments are able to help fulfill this com-
mandment or whether some might even say they are mandatory, it might moti-
vate Rabbis to permit the procedure, despite some other problems with the le-
gality of the arrangements.
Rabbi Goldberg’s discussion with the Surrogate Motherhood Approvals
Committee reveals his own reliance on the importance of procreation in Jewish
law.224 He specifically says that he would likely recommend that a woman en-
gage in a surrogate agreement in accordance with the Israeli law for her first
child, but would not a priori recommend it for the second child.225 He explains
that while the fulfillment of the command to be “fruitful and multiply” is con-
tingent upon having two children, only if a couple does not have any children
must the husband go to extremes to produce a child, including asking for a di-
vorce.226 However, if the couple has one child, even without complete fulfill-
ment of the commandment there is no necessity for divorce.227 Rabbi Goldberg’s
explanation demonstrates that his acceptance of the use of surrogate mother-
hood is influenced by the need to have at least one child. He emphasizes the
importance of the commandment to procreate, even to the point of overriding
other potential prohibitions.228
217. See Pinhas Shifman, A Perspective on Surrogate Motherhood in Jewish Law, in FRONTIERS OF
FAMILY LAW (1993); see also Pinhas Shifman, New Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law, 12 JEWISH
L. ANN. 127, 133 (1997).
218. B. Talmud, Yevamot 64(a).
219. Id. at Commentary of Rashi.
220. See FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL AND JEWISH LAW 37-41 (1968).
221. Id.
222. See Pinhas Shifman, New Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law, supra note 217, at 133.
However, there is vast disagreement as to whether these methods of reproductive technology are
permissible and, if they are, whether they actually fulfill this command in any event. See Shteinberg,
supra note 111, vol. II 138-141 and vol. I 148-150.
223. See Shifman, supra note 217, at 235.
224. Goldberg, supra note 176, at 46-47.
225. Id. at 47.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. But see Bleich, supra note 188, at 391. Rabbi Bleich argues that the commandment to procre-
ate is fulfilled when a man engages in coital activity with the prescribed frequency, “and the birth of
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The desire to have men use this procedure to fulfill the commandment of
procreation is, in all likelihood, at least a partial reason that there is less atten-
tion given to the potential problems of the contractual arrangement. Insisting
that a gestational mother must consent after the child’s birth would likely dis-
courage such procedures.229 But while this may be an explanation, it does not
justify ignoring the maternal affiliation of the birth mother and of the child. It is
problematic to ignore the legal status of the birth mother in order allow men to
fulfill a commandment. There is significant precedent for putting less emphasis
on this commandment in order to preserve the honor and status of the women
concerned.230 Authorities have cautioned men against divorcing their wives to
fulfill the commandment, in deference to their wives’ feelings.231 Similar consid-
eration might be applicable in the case of surrogate motherhood, where the
status of the birth mother is denigrated.
B. Adoption under Jewish Law
A likely explanation for Jewish authorities’ lack of insistence that surrogacy
contracts provide for formal adoption of the child, instead of an immediate
transfer of parental rights, is that Jewish law does not recognize the concept of
legal adoption.232 De facto adoption was common in biblical times, e.g., the
adoption of Moses by Batya, the daughter of Pharaoh, and other examples of a
child being born to one set of parents and then raised by another.233 Despite
the children is merely the terminus ad quem beyond which sexual activity within the context of a
marital relationship yields the conclusion that no form of assisted procreation is mandatory.” Id. He
cites as proof the fact that artificial reproduction is not considered mandatory by the vast majority of
Jewish Law authorities. See also Bleich, Sperm Banking in Anticipation of Infertility, 29/4 TRADITION 47,
53-36. However, not mandating artificial reproduction can also be explained by Jewish law opinions
that forbid or take issue with such procedures. See supra notes 184-85. Even if these procedures are
acceptable to one Rabbi, he may not want to mandate that which is questionable according to other
respected authorities. In addition, such procedures can be difficult emotionally and complicated
physically. Rabbi Bleich does not account for the legal Jewish precept, discussed above, which or-
ders a man to make other arrangements to fulfill the commandment to procreate after ten years of
cohabitating with his wife. See B. Talmud, Yevamot 64(a). There is much discussion related to what a
husband’s responsibilities are after the ban, with much disagreement as to the proper recourse. See
DAVID FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW 36-41 (1968). Rabbi Bleich is in the minority be-
cause according to most Jewish law authorities, the act of regular intercourse with one’s wife does
not fulfill the commandment.
229. See ALONI COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 45.
230. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 220, at 40 (citing R. Jacob Tannenbaum, Responsa Naharei
Afars’mon, E.H. no. 18 (1983) (arguing that divorce against a woman’s will should not be permitted
even to fulfill the commandment of procreation as not to hurt his wife)) and 41R (citing Hayyim Ye-
hudah Lev, Responsa Sha’arei Deah, No. 117 (arguing that divorcing one’s wife against one’s will
would be a violation of wronging another)). Therefore, there is precedent for arguing that the com-
mandment is not absolute and that the honor and effect to the third-party woman should be consid-
ered.
231. Id.
232. See GOLD, supra note 205, at 153.
233. See Genesis 15:2-3, wherein Abraham appoints his servant Eliezer as his legal heir in absence
of a natural heir; B. Talmud Sanhedrin 19b (discussing various places in The Bible where a child is
raised by another family and is thus considered to be the son of the parents’ who raised him). How-
ever, in none of these cases is the biological link severed nor an adoption arranged; rather, the addi-
tional parental relationship results from the de facto care of the child.
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these de facto arrangements, adoption as a legal institution is not acknowledged
in Jewish law. Adoption in scripture was informally arranged because a child
was orphaned and needed the help of others.234 Similarly, this de facto arrange-
ment would be carried out when parents had no heirs and therefore granted
their possessions as inheritance to an “adopted” child.235 When a child is
adopted de facto, the adoptive parents give him her name and identity.236
The importance of biological lineage in Jewish law explains the absence of
adoption as a legal procedure in Jewish law.237 Jewish law places great impor-
tance on a child’s biological identity and status. It is birth that establishes the
lineage and status of the child; who he can marry, the laws of inheritance, obli-
gations to parents, etc.238 Such identity is permanent and cannot be changed by a
legal procedure such as adoption. The transferring of the status of children is
not part of the Jewish legal system, not for adoption and therefore is not a natu-
ral concept to be used for surrogate motherhood either.
Adoption as a legal procedure was first established in Justinian Roman
Law, where establishing heirs were very important and little emphasis was
placed on bloodlines.239 In contrast, the English common law system did not ac-
knowledge adoption.240 English common law, like Jewish law, placed such a
strong emphasis on bloodlines for inheritance and property titles that adoption
was forbidden in England.241 Informal adoption was common, but adoptive
children were left in a legal limbo under the common law.242
Due to the Israeli legislature’s putative desire to accommodate Jewish law
in adoption proceedings, among other laws, the Surrogate Motherhood Agree-
ments Law is the one and only case of transferred parental identity in Israeli
law, if one considers the gestational mother the legal mother.243 Therefore, for
those Jewish legal theorists who believe that the gestational mother is the legal
mother of the child, the Israeli law is a unique deviation from the norms of Jew-
ish law.
234. See Esther 2:7 (“He [Mordechai] was foster father to Hadassah – Esther—his uncle’s daugh-
ter, for she had neither father nor mother.”).
235. See Genesis 15:2 (Abraham says to God; “Since you have granted me no offspring, my stew-
ard will be my heir.”).
236. See GOLD, supra note 205, at 154-56. The Talmud discusses the relations between de facto
adopting parents and their adopted children in B. Talmud, Sanhedrin 13(b).
237. See GOLD, supra note 205, at 157.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 158; see also MENACHEM ELON, MISHPAT HAIVRI 670 (1973).
240. See GOLD, supra note 205, at 158.
241. Id. at 158 (citing EDMUND BLAIR BOLLES, THE PENGUIN ADOPTION HANDBOOK 23 (1984)); C.
M. A. McLauliff, The First English Adoption Law and Its American Precursors, 16 SETON HALL L. REV.
656, 659-60 (1986).
242. See GOLD, supra note 205, at 158.
243. In recognition of the Jewish law, and unlike the Surrogate Agreements Law, the Israeli
adoption law transfers only the obligations of custody to the adoptive parents, creating a synthesis
between the common law system and the Roman system. Careful records are kept for the sake of
personal status, inheritance laws and marriage eligibility. See Israel Adoption Law, 1996 A.G. 21 §
29. See Mordechai Halperin, Protocol 3 of the Public Professional Committee to Decipher the Case of
Egg Donations (May 17, 2000) (unpublished, on file with the author).
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In the sole minority opinion of the Aloni Commission Report, Dr. Halperin
includes in his recommendation for surrogacy contracts a formal adoption pro-
cedure in compliance with Israeli Adoption Law (1981). He concedes that it
would be an expedited procedure because it is an adoption between family re-
lations, as the intended father is also the legal father.244 However, as in keeping
with the Jewish law understanding of the establishment of motherhood, a for-
mal adoption procedure would have to be undertaken.
There is precedent in Jewish law that can be used as a foundation for the
adoption relationship. The concept of an apotropos, (legal guardian), who has le-
gal responsibility for the child and legal authority over the property of the minor
is discussed in The Talmud.245 However, the child maintains his biological iden-
tity and natural rights and responsibilities as pertain to the child of natural par-
ents. This apotropos is similar to the formulation of the adoptive parent provided
in the Israeli adoption law, except that adoption is arranged in advance as op-
posed to a de facto apotropos. Since rabbinic authorities have already accepted
this form of adoption, and since similar arrangements were valid under Jewish
law, there is room for rabbinic authorities to insist that adoption occur in the
gestational surrogate motherhood. Such insistence would validate the surrogate
mother’s status and give her the leverage of having to agree to the transfer upon
the child’s birth, which would go far to prevent exploitation and violation of her
status and rights as the natural mother.
C. Custody as a Function of Duty as opposed to Rights
An important element of these surrogacy agreements is that regardless of
the identity of the mother, the father also has claims to the child. Ultimately,
even if the surrogate mother is considered the legal mother, it remains to be de-
termined who has custody of the child.
The significance of the issue of custody was demonstrated in the case of In
re Baby M.246 In Baby M, Mary Beth Whitehead, a married mother of two, agreed
to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of William Stern, and to give up the
child to him for a fee of $10, 000.247 Three days after the baby was born, Mrs.
Whitehead gave the baby to the Sterns. Mrs. Whitehead then changed her mind
about the baby, convinced the Sterns to return the baby to her temporarily, and
then ultimately informed the Sterns that she had decided to keep the child. Af-
ter a long and bitter dispute between Mrs. Whitehead and the Sterns, the case
ended up in court. The trial court determined that the surrogacy contract was
valid and that the child therefore should be given to the Sterns.248 The decision
was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which determined unani-
mously that the surrogacy contract was invalid and that Mrs. Whitehead was
the legal mother and therefore retained parental rights as the child’s legal
mother.249
244. ALONI COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 93.
245. See B. Talmud, Sanhedrin 13(b), 19(b).
246. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1227 (N.J. 1988).
247. Id. at 1235.
248. Id. at 1237.
249. Id. at 1240.
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However, even after a long struggle by Mrs. Whitehead, the court held that
the issue of custody was to be determined solely by the child’s best interests,
and it agreed with the lower court that the best interests of the child dictated
that the father should have sole legal and physical custody.250 Therefore, even
though Mrs. Whitehead was determined to be the legal mother of the child, the
court determined that custody should be awarded to the father.
In the U.S., the right to conceive and to raise one’s own children has been
deemed “essential” by the U.S. Supreme Court.251 Raising one’s own child is a
matter of rights to the child, even if custody is ultimately decided according to a
‘best interests’ standard. As between parents, both parents have standing to as-
sert their rights to the child and have rights to visitation.252
In Jewish law the issue is complicated by the ethical elements that a relig-
ious legal system entails. Moshe Silberg, a former associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Israel, gave a paper that stresses the dichotomy between rights
and duties in Jewish law.253 Silberg writes, “[I]n Jewish law it is very difficult to
mark the border between the utilitarian and the moral considerations of the leg-
islator and determine the nature of the res which a certain provision of the law
seeks to protect.”254 He discusses the inextricable relationship of law and morals
in Jewish law; the law itself does not only order relationships between man and
man but also between man and God. The system in its entirety is religious in
origin and therefore involves obligations to God.
In order to demonstrate this thesis he asks the question, “Why should a
man pay his debt or fulfill an obligation which he has undertaken?”255 Secular
jurists would presumably respond that the obligation corresponds with the right
of an individual to hold property. However, in Jewish law the issue is more
complicated. There is a disagreement as to whether the payment of an obliga-
tion is a civil legal duty owed to the second party stemming from the right to
hold property, or whether it is a religious moral duty requiring the debtor to re-
pay his debt. The Talmud states, “The paying of the debt is a precept [religious
duty] and minors are not obliged to fulfill the precepts.”256 The consequence of
this determination is that when a person refuses to pay his debt, “he is physi-
cally coerced to fulfill his religious obligation to pay.”257 Silberg relates, “The
250. Id. at 1258.
251. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding that the right to conceive and raise one’s own children is among the “basic civil rights of
man.”)
252. Only in exceptional cases are visitation rights of biological parents not granted. See, e.g.,
Kemp v. Kemp, 399 A.2d 923, 927-28 (Md. App. 1979) (stating that visitation rights would be denied
only where any interaction with a parent would be “so detrimental to the child as seriously to en-
danger his well-being”). This distinction between duties and rights is also present in the area of pro-
creation, whereas in Judaism there is an obligation to procreate; in the U.S. there is a right to procre-
ate. See Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 535.
253. Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 306 (1961) (English
translation of a paper given at the Third J. L. Magnes Memorial Lecture at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, 1951).
254. Id. at 311.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 312, quoting Rabbi Papa, in B. Talmud Tractate Arakin 22(a).
257. Id.
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concern of the court is not the creditor’s debt, his damages, but the duty of the
debtor, his religious-moral duty, the fulfillment of the precept by him. The
creditor receives his money incidentally, as a secondary result of the perform-
ance of this duty.”258 Silberg stresses the emphasis on duty as opposed to rights,
and the indelible place the concept of duty has in Jewish law.
Likewise, the matter of the custody of a child is primarily a duty rather
than a right, governed by the principle of the child’s best interests.259 The over-
riding principle is that the parents have only duties while the children have
rights to have their custody determined on the basis of their best interests. A
parent is allowed to sue for custody, but not by asserting her rights, only based
on the child’s interests, regardless of any prior custody agreements.260
Michael Broyde writes that although Rabbinic discussions on surrogate
motherhood have centered on the definition of the legal mother for various rit-
ual obligations, he argues that these ritual issues tend not to be the crucial ones
to the couple or surrogate mother seeking such children.261 He argues that when
maternal identity is legally in doubt or in dispute and paternal identity is estab-
lished, maternal custody should be granted to the wife of the father regardless of
who is determined to be the legal mother under Jewish law.262 He offers two ba-
sic rationales for this determination.263
First, the obligation to financially support children is assigned only to
men.264 Upon analysis of Rabbi Asher’s decisions on custody, Michael Broyde
states that he adopts the theory that the father is the presumptive custodial par-
ent of his children.265 The presumption of paternal custody is based on the fa-
ther’s obligations to support the child and his rights as a natural parent, subject
258. Id. at 312-13.
259. See, e.g., S. Aderet, Responsa Rashba (related to Ramban) 38; D. Ben-Zimra, Responsa Radbaz
1:123; Moshe Iserles, Even Haezer 82:7; Avraham Z.H. Eizenshtadt, Pitchei Teshuva, Even Haezer 82:7
(stating that the custody of children is in the court’s discretion and is determined based on the
child’s best interests); Responsa Rashdam, Even Ha’ezer 123 (noting that the principle that a daughter’s
custody is generally granted to the mother is based on the daughter’s rather than the mother’s
rights); File 226/53-54, 1 P.D.R. 145, 157-158 (child custody laws are not concerned with the parents’
benefits but rather with the child’s; parents have no rights, but only duties); Appeal 170 58-59, 3
P.D.R. 353, 359 (ruling that child custody is determined by the child’s best interests rather than the
parties’ consent); see also B.D.M. 1/81, Nagar v. Nagar, P.D. 38(1) 365 (1981); E. Shochetman, Jewish
law Regarding Custody of Children, 5 SHNATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 285, 292 (1978).
260. See, e.g., Be’er Heitev, Even Haezer 82:6, File 3301/54-55, 2 P.D.R. 298, 300 (citing 2 RESPONSA
MABIT 62). Furthermore, even if the court approved the agreement, it is subject to change if the
child’s interests require it. See File 43/ 77-78, 11 P.D.R. 153, 161 (stating that the interests of the child
are subject to change as are the court’s decisions in custody matters).
261. Michael J. Broyde, Child Custody and Jewish Law: A Pure Law Analysis, 7 JEWISH L. ASS’N STUD.
1, 18-19 n.69 (1988).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See B. Talmud, Ketubot 49(b), 65(b); Moses Maimonides, supra note 192, The Book of Women,
The Laws of Marriage 12:14; Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 71:1. Although the parties may agree to
assign the mother the duties toward the children, the agreement would not affect the children, who
are entitled to sue only the father. See Appeal 152/58, 3 P.D.R. 170, 171.
265. Broyde, supra note 261, at 3.
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to the limitation that even a natural parent cannot have custody of his children if
he is factually unfit to raise them.266
Second, he explains that another basic principle of custody law as ex-
plained by Rabbi Solomon ben R. Aderet (Rashba), is that child custody should
be determined according to the best interests of the child.267 Given the reality in
surrogate motherhood that the intended parents are those of greater means and
have initiated the conception of the child, Broyde argues that it would almost
always be in the child’s best interest for the intended parents to have custody.
This analysis might support the Surrogate Agreements Law, which presump-
tively gives custody to the intended parents, but which can be overturned if the
surrogate mother can show significant change in circumstances.
While the basic principles stated by Broyde above may be substantial
enough to always lead Rabbinical figures to give custody of the child to the fa-
ther, it should be pointed out that the presumptions of the Talmud are that un-
der certain situations the legal mother would have sole custody of the child. The
Talmud embraces three rules that generally govern child custody, which are
adjusted according to factual findings of best interests of the child.268 First, cus-
tody of all children under the age of six is to be given to the mother; second,
custody of boys over the age of six is to be given to the father; and third, custody
of girls over the age of six is to be given to the mother.269
Broyde’s claim that the best interests of the child will always be with the
intended parents is controversial from an empirical perspective and under-
mined by the Talmudic presumptions.270 In many instances, it would be reason-
able to argue that a mother’s care is more important than a father’s means or
vice versa. Presuming that the father is the better parent because the woman
engaged in surrogate motherhood agreements only serves to further denigrate
the woman who took part in the agreement.271
Therefore, despite the fact that the duty for childcare lies with the father
and that custody is a matter of duty and not right, the mother does have a valid
claim that the best interest of her child is to be raised with her. At the very least,
there is room for discussion and factual findings on the matter in a Rabbinical
Court, as opposed to an unquestioned delegation of custody to the father.
D. Explanations Without Justifications
Ultimately, the above-mentioned principles, the commandment to men to
procreate, the lack of legal recognition of adoption, and the notion of custody as
266. Id. at 4.
267. Id.
268. B. Talmud, Eruvin 82(a); B. Talmud Ketubot 65(b), 122(b)-123(a).
269. Id. For a detailed discussion of these sources, see Basil Herring, Child Custody, in JEWISH
ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIMES II 177 (1989).
270. See, e.g., Bonnie Steinbock, Surrogate Motherhood as Prenatal Adoption, 16/1 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 44, 46 (1988) (arguing that the assessment of surrogate mother’s ability to be a good
mother is biased by middle-class prejudices); see also Rothman, supra note 8, at 242-45 (arguing that
pregnancy and interpersonal relationships determine fitness to parent and not genetic ties or intent)
(1989).
271. See id.
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a right rather than an obligation all provide reasons for the Rabbinical authori-
ties tendency to condone the Israeli Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Act, de-
spite the gestational surrogate’s status as the legal mother of the child. How-
ever, none of these principles provides a definitive justification for overriding
the surrogate mother’s legal status. Allowing the waiver of familial status in
Jewish law is unprecedented and seems worthy of some formal pronouncement
or explanation. Jewish law should at least provide that a gestational surrogate
mother be afforded some protection, either by establishing an obligatory adop-
tion procedure after the child is born, in which the mother can freely waive her
parental duties and rights, or, alternately, by granting the gestational mother a
custody hearing in accordance with the dictates of Jewish law, if she so desires.
Furthermore, due to the abrogation of the birth mother’s status, it might also be
reasonable for Jewish law to outlaw these surrogate contracts altogether.
V. FROM GENDER DIFFERENCE AND GENDER NEUTRALITY TO PATRIARCHY
The majority opinion in Jewish law is that gestation is the defining charac-
teristic of motherhood. Defining motherhood by that which is unique to moth-
ers, as discussed by Rabbi Engel,272 and more explicitly by Rabbi Bick,273 is based
on the Jewish law recognition of differences between men and women.
Gender difference in Jewish law is founded upon the biblical passage in
Genesis: “And the Lord God said, it is not good that Adam is alone, let Me make
for him a helper opposite him (ezer ke-negdo).”274 This biblical passage points to
the differences between men and women—they are not both just humans but
complements to one another.275
A basic legal distinction is made between men and women: positive com-
mandments whose performance is limited to a specific time are binding only on
men, whereas positive commandments not limited to a specific time of perform-
ance are binding on both women and men.276 There are many reasons provided
for this legal doctrine,277 the most cogent of which is that the respective roles of
272. See supra notes 149-45 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 157-63.
274. Genesis 2:18. There is much discussion as to the meaning of the phrase “ezer ke negdo,” liter-
ally a helper opposite him, or against him. Rashi contends that the phrase alludes to two potential
relationships: “If he is meritorious, she will be a help; if he is not meritorious [she will be] against
him to fight.” Rashi to Genesis 2:18. An interpretation that better fits with the flow of the text is to
understand ‘opposite him’ as next to or beside him.
275. See AVRAHAM WEISS, WOMEN AT PRAYER 1-12 (1990).
276. See B. Talmud, Kiddushin 29(a). There are numerous exceptions to this rule. Rabbi Saul
Berman’s analysis of the laws women are exempt from reveals that the number of commandments
which are exceptions to his rule is greater than the number following the rule. Saul Berman, The
Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism, 14 TRADITION no. 2, 5-28 (1973).
277. One reason offered is that because a woman is obligated to fulfill the needs of her husband,
she is not mandated to perform obligations fixed by time because it would create conflict between
her duties to her husband and her duties to God (Sefer Abudarham ha-Shalem, Seder Tefillot she Hol, Ha-
sh’ar ha Shelishi, Birkhot ha-Mitzvot). See Weiss, supra note 275, at 5-6. But see Akedat Yizhak to Genesis
30:1-2 (citing, in English, Nehama Leibowitz, STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF GENESIS 334 (1990) (arguing
that a woman’s obligations to her husband are only secondary to her obligations to God)). Rabbi
Aharon Solobveichick maintains that women are exempt from some positive commandments fixed
by time since they are intrinsically aware—by virtue of their innate spiritual superiority—of the
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men and women are considered to be distinct.278 Women are primarily obligated
to fulfill laws pertaining to private Jewish ritual, centered in the home, while
men are obligated to fulfill and maintain the public performance of Jewish rit-
ual. This understanding of role differentiation is based on the verse, “The king’s
daughter is all glorious within. . .”279 Since different roles are attributed to the
two genders in Jewish law, extending this difference to the area of motherhood
is a natural progression. It is consistent with the underlying principles of Jewish
law that motherhood is established in a manner distinct from fatherhood.280
In Jewish law, the recognition of gender difference leads to a finding that
gestation, the distinctly feminine aspect of motherhood, is the defining charac-
teristic of motherhood. In Jewish law there is no suspicion of treating gender as
a reason for difference as there is in the U.S. under equal protection analysis.
The tendency to regard genders differently need not be negative (although
it often accounts for too much); it could lead to valuing and protecting those as-
pects of womanhood, such as gestation, that are simply different. The emphasis
on gender difference in Jewish law could potentially serve as a solid platform to
protect surrogate mothers by giving credence to the importance of pregnancy
and childbearing, the biological domain of women. Providing the gestational
mother substantive legal protection against the fear of financial exploitation and,
at least, granting her the ability to withdraw from the contract if she feels she
does not want to surrender the child she has carried for nine months, would
honor the status of motherhood in Judaism by elevating it above the level of
contract.
However, Jewish law’s sensitivity to gender difference is not neutral. It is
patriarchal in that men occupy a dominant position in its interpretation and ap-
plication. It is not only the spheres of influence that are separated in Jewish law.
The basic familial structure is not based only on role differentiation; it is also hi-
erarchical. The man is the leader of the household and has significant power
and control over the women and children in his family. The obligation to have
children, the importance of seed and heritage, the duties of support and the
rights of custody, as well as the laws of inheritance, all lie with the male and his
progeny.281
This hierarchical structure is demonstrated forcefully in the different
weight that is placed on the status of motherhood and fatherhood in Jewish law.
The asymmetry of the sexes under Jewish law is clearly highlighted in the ulti-
mate rejection of overriding paternity in the case of artificial insemination by
donor (AID). AID raises similar problems of Jewish law to surrogate mother-
hood. In Jewish law, the child of a woman inseminated by AID is considered to
be the biological child of that woman and the sperm donor.282 The question of
message these laws convey. Rabbi Aharon Soloveichick, The Attitude of Judaism Toward the Woman, in
MAJOR ADDRESSES DELIVERED AT MID-CONTINENT CONCLAVE AND NATIONAL LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE, UNION OF ORHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS 21-32 (1969).
278. See Berman, supra note 276, at 16-18.
279. Psalms 45:13.
280. See supra notes 140-45, 157-63 and 275-80 and accompanying text.
281. See infra Part V(a).
282. See B. Talmud, Yebamot 2:5; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Isurei Bi’ah 12:7; see also GOLD, su-
pra note 205, at 106-115; Ben Meir, supra note 99, at 153; Zohar, supra note 166, at 71-75.
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whether AID can be used by infertile couples under Jewish law implicates the
problem of waiving the paternity of the sperm donor just as gestational surro-
gate motherhood leads to a waiver of the maternity of the surrogate under Jew-
ish law.
AID in Jewish law has been the subject of considerable debate.283 The ma-
jority of authorities do not permit AID by a married woman at all, and there is
no authoritative opinion that permits AID from the sperm of a Jewish man.284
There are a number of reasons given for the prohibition. One is the fear of
mamzerut, which has been rejected by the majority of rabbinic authorities as ir-
relevant in AID.285 Another is the importance of preserving the lineage of the
child, also a factor in surrogate motherhood, which is ultimately dispositive in
most of the strong objections to this procedure by rabbinic authorities.286 A third
is the fear that such an arrangement would alienate the husband, who would
have to raise another man’s child in his home.287
The Rabbinical courts in Israel have not sanctioned artificial insemination.
In fact, they have found the wife’s use of AID to be legitimate grounds for di-
vorce.288 As one Israeli commentator noted, “Whereas according to the secular
outlook, the desire to help the childless couple to build a family is the primary
concern, the Religious Court goes to great lengths to discourage the couple from
adopting this path, e.g., by declaring the wife a quasi-adulteress.”289 Most sig-
283. See, e.g., D.M. Kreuzer, Hazar’ah Melakhutit—Berur Habe’ayah, 1 NO’AM 111-128 (1958); S.Z.
Auerbach, Hazar’ah Melachutit 1 No’am 146-158 (1958); Mosheh Feinstein, Responsa Iggrot Moshe, EVEN
HA’EZER 71 (1959); Mosheh Feinstein, Responsa Iggrot Moshe, Even Ha’ezer 2:11 (1962); Eliezer Wal-
denberg, Responsa Tzits Eliezer III, no. 27 (1951); Eliezer Waldenberg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, IX, no.
51:4 (1967) [hereinafter Waldenberg IX]; Avraham Shteinberg, Hazar’ah Melakhutit Le’or Hahalakhah, 1
Sefer Assia 128-141 (1976); Yizhak Ya’akov Weiss, Responsa Minhat Yizhak IV:5 (1964).
284. See id. As Rabbi Waldenberg summarizes, “It is forbidden to fertilize a married woman
with the seed of another man by means of artificial insemination; such a deed is a great abomination
and very evil. Indeed, some tend towards the view that a married woman who does so is even for-
bidden to her husband.” Waldenberg IX, supra note 283, at no. 51:4(2). But see Rabbi Moses Fein-
stein, Responsa Iggerot Moshe, EH #71 (1959) (allowing AID with the sperm of a non-Jewish man but
only with the consent of the husband).
285. The concern is that mixing a married woman’s egg with a man’s seed would be an act of
adultery causing the labeling of the child as illegitimate. However, the majority of sources have held
that it is the act of intercourse and not the mixing of seeds that causes illegitimacy in children. See
MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 626 (1999) (citing Bayit Hasash to Tur YD ch.
195); Moses Feinstein, Responsa Iggerot Moshe, II:11 (1962) (explaining that AID does not constitute
prohibited intercourse and thus there is no fear of mamzerut); Avraham Shteinberg, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS I:154 (1991) (“[T]he majority of the decisors reason that the violation of
adultery is in the physical act of sexual intercourse and its enjoyment.”).
286. See Genesis 17:7; B. Talmud, Yevamot 41(a); Rashi’s commentary to B. Talmud Yevamot 41(a).
287. See Waldenberg IX, supra note 283, at no. 51:1-3.
288. See Eliav Shochetman, Paternity of the Children Born By Artificial Insemination, 10 Mishpatim
63 (1980); see also Pinhas Shifman, Family Law in Israel: The Struggle Between Religious and Secular Law,
24 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 537, 543 n.31 (1990) (citing the decision of the Supreme Rabbinical Court in
App. 49/5745 of 4 TEVET, 5746 (1986)). The court determined that even when the husband encour-
ages the wife to undergo artificial insemination from a donor who is not her husband, he is exempt
from maintenance of the child, “and even though he acted improperly, in any case she too is held
responsible for her actions, and she ought to have objected to his suggestion that she undergo artifi-
cial insemination from a donor, thus causing an outrage in Israel.” Id. Rabbi Yosef determined that
no child support was due to this child because he had no legitimate place in Israel.
289. Shifman, supra note 288.
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nificantly, despite decades of use in Israel, a national law has not been passed in
Israel to regulate AID due in part to significant objection to such a procedure by
the Jewish law authorities in Israel.290
Paternity in Jewish law is an unshakeable status in which there are embed-
ded many responsibilities and duties. Ultimately Jewish law does not exhibit
the same tolerance for overriding paternity as it has shown for overriding ma-
ternity. It is distressing that the consideration for the importance of parental
status when applied to men leads rabbinical authorities to outlaw AID, and
when applied to women is overridden by concern for men’s obligations and re-
spect for men’s responsibilities. Motherhood and fatherhood are different, and
therefore it is legitimate to define them differently as they entail different proc-
esses. However, both motherhood and fatherhood are essential biological de-
terminations and are worthy of equal protection and recognition. The fact that
motherhood can be overridden according to Jewish law authorities, while fa-
therhood cannot, is cause for serious concern.
Furthermore, Rabbi Goldberg’s rationale for overriding the status of moth-
erhood—to allow men to fulfill their obligation to procreate—is disconcerting
when viewed from a broader perspective. Given that the majority opinion in
Jewish law is that the surrogate is considered the legal mother, this reasoning
subjugates mothers to men for the purpose of providing children: exactly the
way in which many have characterized the danger of surrogate motherhood.291
While gender difference goes so far as to marginalize and alienate women
in Jewish law, U.S. law has not done enough to recognize physiological differ-
ences in gender. U.S. courts have perceived gestational surrogates as little more
than wombs for rent and have not acknowledged the body of literature that
demonstrates the considerable attachment and physical intimacy that develop
during pregnancy.292 The actual effects of the gestational mother’s conduct on
the fetus and the real responsibility and influence the gestational mother has on
the fetus is also left unrecognized.293 In various U.S. jurisdictions, the application
of gender difference to surrogate motherhood has been seriously challenged.
One court has held, and a number of legal commentators have argued, that de-
fining motherhood and fatherhood on the basis of different principles, i.e.,
motherhood on gestation and fatherhood on genetic input, is a violation of the
290. For a discussion of this matter, see Pinhas Shifman, Determining Fatherhood in a Child Born of
Artificial Insemination, 10 Mishpatim 197 (1980) (Hebrew, translated by the author); see also Michael
Korinaldi, The Legal Status of a Child Born of Artificial Means from a Sperm Donor or an Egg Donor, 18
SHNATON MISHPAT HAIVRI 115 (1985).
291. ROTHMAN, supra note 8, 29-48, 229-46. For a futuristic rendition of this fear, see MARGARET
ATWOOD, A HANDMAIDEN’S TALE (1986).
292. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New
Laws, 14 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 50 (1984); Katharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293,
329-30 (1988).
293. See, e.g., L.W. Sontag, Parental Determinants of Postnatal Behavior, in FETAL GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT (1970); Dennis Scott, Follow-up Study from Birth of the Effects of Prenatal Stresses, 15
DEVELOPMENTAL MEDICINE AND CHILD NEUROLOGY 770, 770-87 (1973); B. R. H. Van den Bergh, The
Influence of Maternal Emotions During Pregnancy on Fetal and Neonatal Behavior, 5 J. PRENATAL &
PERINATAL PSYCHOL. & HEALTH 127 (1990).
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equal protection clause.294 The basis for this holding is that in the area of defin-
ing parenthood the state has no legitimate interest in using gender classification.
However, the equal protection clause only affords equality to those who
are similarly situated. Since women are unique in their childbearing capabili-
ties, the equal protection clause should not dictate that gestation cannot be used
as a determinant of motherhood. The fact that a woman undergoes the process
of pregnancy is a fact of nature and to recognize it is hardly a violation of the
equal protection clause. Rather, ignoring this important feature of motherhood
in favor of sole consideration of genetic input or intention is to use male criteria
to define motherhood, a female category. Thus, U.S. law, like Jewish law, is pa-
triarchal in its sole use of male categories to define that which is inherently fe-
male.
Furthermore, the U.S. courts’ understanding of the concept of the natural
mother as a gender-neutral, objective person is misleading. Given that both
gestation and ovum donation are biological, natural contributions to the pro-
duction of a child, it is perplexing to call the genetic mother the natural mother.
Designating the intentional mother as the natural mother because she is the one
who wants the child is an even more confounded use of the term natural. The
fact is that nature is not gender-neutral, and to pick and choose the natural
mother based on that which is the male contribution of genes, or on a modern
concept of intent, is artificial. U.S. courts must either be more gendered in de-
fining natural motherhood or ignore such an inquiry altogether and choose a
new means of determination. But the artifice so far used by U.S. courts betrays
the concept of nature and the complexity of female reproduction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Separating gestation from genetics allows us to ask new questions about
the nature and defining characteristics of motherhood. Developing a legal re-
sponse to such a question reveals much about the relevant legal framework. In
the U.S., reproductive technology is viewed as a means to achieve the end of
having genetically-related children or, in egg donation, as a means of experi-
encing a pregnancy which would otherwise not be possible. Due to this ap-
proach, the U.S., on the whole, is inclined to define motherhood by intent or ge-
netics and to permit the surrogate contract as long as there is some physiological
connection between the intended parents and their child.
Jewish law is faced with a more ancient and less flexible legal structure,
due to its self-identification as divinely ordained. Jewish law uses traditional
sources to try to determine a very elusive modern phenomenon, and in the case
of gestational surrogacy, arrives at a very different result than the more future-
oriented, utilitarian secular systems of law.
The U.S. legal system can learn a number of lessons from Jewish law. The
concept of natural in Jewish law is much more rigid and well-defined. While the
term “natural” is tossed often used loosely in U.S. case law and policy papers,
Jewish law has exact definitions of the meaning of natural, and such definitions
could help U.S. lawmakers and jurists to clarify what they mean by natural.
294. See Soos v. Soos, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); see, e.g., Schultz, supra note 8.
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Specifically, it might serve as a lesson of when the concept of natural ought to be
avoided or overridden when it reflects outdated concepts of the sacredness of
lineage, impurity of seed, and paternal control of offspring. U.S. courts ought to
consider dismissing the notion of a single natural mother and being more honest
about the conceptual difficulties they are encountering, and the need for protec-
tion for all who are parties to the artificial agreement of surrogate motherhood.
In addition, when U.S. jurists use the concept of the natural mother, or
when they simply look to designate a legal mother, they can look to a more tra-
ditional system to understand the implications of such a status—namely the im-
portance of gender difference and the separate roles of men and women in re-
production. Such separation is a practical understanding of the importance that
gestation and child-rearing has traditionally played in women’s lives. These
elements of a woman’s life must be recognized before the gestational mother’s
status is completely marginalized in favor of the intended mother. The fact that
gestation determines motherhood in Jewish law may alert secular jurists to the
traditional importance placed on the act of giving birth and weaning a child. To
ignore these feminine aspects of motherhood is patriarchal in that it uses male
standards for inherently female categories.
The developed jurisprudence of surrogate motherhood in U.S. law pro-
vides many insights into Jewish law. Most significantly, it emphasizes the ir-
regularity of defining the gestational surrogate as the legal mother while allow-
ing gestational surrogacy without any formal adoption proceeding or
mandatory consent from the mother. In U.S. jurisprudence, which is more flexi-
ble in defining motherhood, defining the mother has real consequences in terms
of how feasible gestational surrogate motherhood is as a legal process. This dis-
crepancy necessitates a more intense analysis of what makes Jewish legal theo-
rists permit surrogate motherhood. Furthermore, contrasting Jewish law’s un-
derstanding of contracts, reproduction, adoption and custody with U.S. law’s
basic theories of these legal and ethical issues reveals that which is significant
and distinct about each system. The effects of these different theories have led
to different approaches to this complicated issue.
Under Jewish law, the definition of the gestational mother as the legal
mother might have afforded surrogate mothers a protected status in Judaism by
designating gestational surrogates as legal mothers. This status could thereafter
be waived or asserted or, alternately, could lead to either the prohibition or un-
attractiveness of the procedure as a whole. However, due to overarching con-
siderations based on the dominant role of men in Jewish law, the push toward
using technology and creating children has overtaken even the important con-
cept of status. The question is whether Judaism is being progressive in allowing
couples who cannot have children to simulate some process of natural child-
bearing, or whether it is being overwhelmingly patriarchal, subsuming the
rights of women in order to allow men to fulfill their obligations. This article
argues that the latter is the underlying issue, because a similar procreative em-
phasis has not been permitted in AID when it is fatherhood that would be over-
ridden. Where similar considerations that lead rabbinic authorities to outlaw
AID to preserve the place of fatherhood are not used to dignify motherhood, the
picture of the society imbued is one in which, ultimately, children are important
as regards paternal lineage and motherhood is secondary in nature.
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Ultimately, both the U.S. legal system and Jewish law approaches to gesta-
tional surrogate motherhood are patriarchal in that they use male standards and
male interests to supercede female standards and interests. One might conclude
from this analysis that promoting any means of surrogate motherhood would be
patriarchal in that it ignores the gendered nature of pregnancy. However, this is
not necessarily the case. While the option of dual motherhood is not open to
Jewish law, it is a possibility for U.S. law.
Even if, for policy reasons, having two mothers is considered dangerous,
protecting the rights of both mothers by mandating adoption or withdrawal
procedures would not be dangerous. Undoubtedly, such provisions might
make gestational surrogate motherhood less attractive for infertile couples.
While it is likely that this would be the case, the utility of such contracts should
not override the fundamental rights of surrogate mothers. The promotion of
gestational surrogate motherhood can only avoid being patriarchal by taking se-
riously the status and rights of the gestating mother.
